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Abstract 
The DoD and the Air Force continually seek to incorporate new technology in an 
effort to improve communication, work effectiveness, and efficiency.  Office devices 
utilizing Bluetooth technology simplify device configuration and communication.  They 
provide a means to communicate wirelessly over short distances thereby eliminating the 
need for different vendor specific cables and interfaces.  One of the key concerns 
involved in incorporating new communication technology is security; the fundamental 
security concern of wireless communication is interception.  Studies focusing on IEEE 
802.11b have shown vulnerability zones around many DoD installations that reflect the 
ranges at which wireless communications using the 802.11b standard can be intercepted.   
This research identifies the vulnerability zones in which Bluetooth transmissions 
can potentially be intercepted.  Specifically, the orientation of Bluetooth device antenna 
and the distance between devices are varied to determine ranges at which set levels of 
throughput can be achieved for a specific device configuration.  Throughput ranges are 
then mapped to graphically reflect vulnerability zones.  This research shows that the 
range at which Bluetooth communication can occur with unmodified devices is more than 
twice that of the minimum standard of 10 m outlined in the core specification without 
degradation of the best-case throughput level measured.  It is expected that the 
throughput ranges could be greatly extended with some device modification.  This 
research shows that the security risk associated with interception of Bluetooth 
communications is legitimate and warrants further study. 
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Performance Evaluation and Analysis of Effective Range and Data 
Throughput for Unmodified Bluetooth Communication Devices 
1.  Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The ability of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Air Force to accomplish 
their missions relies heavily on the ability to communicate.  Rapid communication of 
information is the grease that turns the wheels of daily operations.  The continual rapid 
development of new technology provides smaller, faster, and cheaper means of 
communication.  Both the DoD and the Air Force continually seek to incorporate new 
technology in an effort to improve communication, mission effectiveness, and efficiency. 
Office devices utilizing Bluetooth technology simplify device configuration and 
communication.  They provide a means to wirelessly communicate over short distances 
thereby eliminating the need for different vendor specific cables and interfaces.  
Bluetooth provides a standard interface that all equipped devices can access and 
communicate through. 
Incorporation of new technology into any existing operation does not come 
without a price.  One of the key concerns involved in communication is security; the 
fundamental security concern of wireless communication is interception.  There are many 
ways of increasing the difficulty of interception such as implementation of spread 
spectrum techniques or encryption.  However, even with these measures it is possible for 
communications to be intercepted. 
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1.2 Background 
The Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC) continually studies different 
protocols and communication standards in use today in an effort to improve the level of 
security.  Studies focusing on IEEE 802.11b have shown vulnerability zones around 
many DoD installations.  These zones reflect the ranges at which wireless 
communications using the 802.11b standard can be intercepted.  With the advent of 
Bluetooth technology and its pending incorporation into the workplace, it is important 
that the same concerns with 802.11b also be addressed for Bluetooth.  Specifically, the 
need exists to determine Bluetooth transmission interception vulnerability regions.  
Although these vulnerability zones are not easily exploited, they are cause for 
concern.  They are an inherent weakness of wireless communications that is often 
exploited.  When a weakness cannot be eliminated, it must be managed to minimize the 
possible effects of its exploitation. 
The simplest way to manage the security weaknesses of the Bluetooth protocol is 
to minimize the possibility of packet transmission interception.  This could be 
accomplished by limiting the physical radius of transmission to within the boundaries of 
a controlled area.  If transmissions are not receivable outside the controlled area, and the 
personnel and equipment within the controlled area are trusted, then the possibility of 
packet transmission interception is minimized.  Thus, the need to establish transmission 
reception ranges of Bluetooth devices is clear. 
1.3 Research Focus 
The primary focus of this research is to provide a basic measurement of the 
transmission range of commercially available Bluetooth devices.  This range 
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measurement provides an initial look at the capabilities of the Bluetooth standard in 
regards to throughput over different distances.  By providing the ranges at which different 
levels of throughput are possible, this study helps to define the proximity distance needed 
to intercept Bluetooth transmissions. 
1.3.1 Objectives 
This research has two objectives.  The first objective is to identify the best 
antenna orientation for a common use configuration of Bluetooth devices.  Each network 
device (laptop) is configured with a Bluetooth transmitter utilizing a small micro-strip 
patch antenna.  The relative transmitter/receiver antenna orientation is expected to be 
significant in determining ranges of throughput. 
The second objective is to utilize the antenna orientation identified by the first 
objective to determine ranges at which fixed levels of throughput can be received.  The 
throughput levels for this study are 300 kbps, 200 kbps, and 100 kbps.  The ranges at 
which these levels of throughput can be received for a set receiver orientation are 
identified and mapped. 
The two objectives above outline this research.  Identification of the best antenna 
orientation is important in properly identifying the throughput ranges.  The primary 
objective is the identification of ranges at which a certain threshold of throughput can be 
achieved.  This supports the primary focus of this research in identifying vulnerability 
ranges of commercially available Bluetooth devices. 
1.3.2 Approach 
This study follows a process to accomplish the above objectives.  First, a review 
of published literature on the Bluetooth standard as well as the Bluetooth core 
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specification is conducted.  Next, a study of a wireless sniffing application for 802.11b 
(Kismet) is done to determine if the same functionality could be incorporated into an 
application for Bluetooth.  Then, an experiment to meet the first objective is conducted 
utilizing the Bluetooth Receiver Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) as a metric.  
The RSSI is used since it is the only signal power function provided in the 
Bluetooth specification.  The RSSI values are captured for different orientations and 
distances and the data is analyzed to determine statistical significance.  Findings relevant 
to the throughput range experiment are incorporated.  Next, the throughput range 
experiment is developed and data measurements are taken.  This data is sampled using 
best-case results – multiple samples are taken, but only the best is recorded.  Last, a map 
of the throughput ranges is constructed reflecting the distances at which fixed levels of 
throughput were received. 
1.4 Summary 
The primary focus of this research is to provide a basic measurement of the 
transmission range of commercially available Bluetooth devices.  A methodology is 
defined for identifying orientation and throughput ranges by varying antenna orientation 
and device distance to meet the objectives.  This research is restricted to specific 
hardware in a particular environment.  It provides a foundation for further study of 
Bluetooth transmissions. 
The rest of this document is presented as follows.  Chapter 2 provides an 
overview of wireless communication technologies and detailed information on the 
Bluetooth standard.  Next, wireless security is discussed followed by Bluetooth specific 
security concerns.  Chapter 3 outlines a detailed methodology for accomplishing the 
 
5 
 
objectives of this research.  Chapter 4 discusses the experiments conducted, the data 
gathered, and analysis of the resulting data.  In Chapter 5, a summary of the research and 
conclusions are presented. 
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2.  Background 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter includes background information helpful in establishing the 
foundation for the research.  The areas covered are wireless communications, Bluetooth, 
wireless communication security issues, and Bluetooth specific security issues.  A brief 
discussion of each of these areas is presented. 
2.2 Wireless Communications 
Wireless communication encompasses transmitting signals through air and space 
using radio frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum.  Both international 
organizations and national governments govern frequency allocation.  In the United 
States, the Federal Communication Commission regulates all commercial frequencies and 
their allocation.  The data carrying capacity and bandwidth of a wireless system is 
dependent on where in the spectrum the transmission frequency is located.  The higher 
the frequency the larger its capacity for transmitted information, but the more susceptible 
the transmission becomes to interference due to atmospheric conditions.  Additionally, 
signal transmission becomes “more directional (line of sight)”[12]. 
Local area networks (LANs) using wireless technologies are becoming more and 
more common.  Utilizing wireless technology facilitates LAN implementation inside and 
between buildings.  Additionally, wireless technologies are used to “provide high-speed 
access to the Internet or to build metropolitan area networks”[12].  The latest addition is 
the advent of mobile computing using higher data rates.  These higher data rates facilitate 
operation comparable to “traditional wired networks”. 
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A family of protocol specifications developed by the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) governs wireless local area networks (WLANs).  The 
802.11 family consists of four specifications: 802.11, 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11e, and 
802.11g.  “All [five] use the Ethernet protocol and CSMA/CA (carrier sense multiple 
access with collision avoidance) for path sharing.”[10].  An additional new family of 
protocol specifications is currently in development by an IEEE working group and a 
special interest group.  The 802.15 family (a.k.a. Bluetooth) consists of 802.15.1, 
802.15.3, and 802.15.4.  This protocol family will be described below. 
2.2.2 Protocols 
802.11 was the first standard in the 802.11 family.  It was accepted by the IEEE in 
1997 and uses phase shift keying modulation to transmit in the 2.4 to 2.48 GHz range.  It 
provides a data rate of 1 to 2 Mbps using either Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum 
(FHSS) or Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS). 
802.11a 
“The 802.11a specification applies to wireless ATM systems and is used in access 
hubs.  The 802.11a protocol operates at radio frequencies between 5 GHz and 6 GHz.  It 
uses a modulation scheme known as orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing 
(OFDM) that makes possible data speeds as high as 54 Mbps, but most commonly, 
communications take place at 6 Mbps, 12 Mbps, or 24 Mbps”[10]. 
802.11b 
Commonly referred to as Wi-Fi, 802.11b is backward compatible with 802.11.  It 
uses complementary code keying (CCK) and transmits at 11 Mbps in the 2.4 GHz range. 
It is less susceptible to multipath-propagation interference than 802.11. 
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802.11e 
802.11e focuses on increasing the bandwidth efficiency of 802.11a and to 
incorporate Quality of Service (QoS) to both 802.11a and 802.11b.  It strives to increase 
the sustainable throughput of 802.11a to around 35 Mbps.  It has the capability to manage 
bandwidth by assigning some packets a priority and by controlling the number of media 
streams on the network. 
802.11g 
802.11g is the most recently approved standard and offers relatively short range 
wireless transmission at rates up to 54 Mbps.  “Like 802.11b, 802.11g operates in the 2.4 
GHz range and is thus compatible with it”[10].  
802.15.1 
Commonly known as Bluetooth, 802.15.1 is the primary protocol standard in the 
802.15 family.  It operates in the 2.45 GHz band and transmits at a rate of up to 1 Mbps. 
802.15.3 
802.15.3 transmits in the 2.45 GHz band as well and “focuses on high-bandwidth 
(about 55 Mbps), low-power MAC and physical layers”[13]. 
802.15.4 
802.15.4 also works in the 2.45 GHz band, but differs from 802.15.3 in that it 
“deals with low-bandwidth (about 250 Kbps), extra-low power MAC and physical 
layers”[13]. 
2.2.3 Transmission Methods 
There are many different ways that wireless communications can occur.  Each 
method provides certain advantages that tend to compensate for the disadvantages of 
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other methods.  Common among these methods are narrow band, spread spectrum, and 
frequency hopping spread spectrum. 
2.2.3.1 Narrow Band 
Narrow band transmissions occur within a specific frequency interval.  “The 
signal occupies a narrow band that is susceptible to interference, either accidental or 
malicious”[12].  These transmissions can be intercepted easily with a radio receiver tuned 
in to the appropriate frequency. 
2.2.3.2 Spread Spectrum 
Spread spectrum transmissions spread the signals out over a very wide frequency 
interval using one of two techniques:  Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum or Frequency 
Hopping Spread Spectrum. 
2.2.3.2.1 Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 
In direct sequence, multiple bits called “chips” are used to represent each bit of 
data to be transmitted.  If 200 chips represent each bit, then the signal is spread out 200 
times its original size.  The signal power is transmitted in noisy bands at power levels 
below the noise, thus it does not interfere with other signals in that band.  In order to 
spread out the data stream, the sender generates a pseudorandom bit stream that 
modulates the original data stream.  The receiver, using the same pseudorandom bit 
stream, then demodulates the transmitted stream. 
2.2.3.2.2 Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum 
Frequency hopping spread spectrum differs from direct sequence in that “the 
original data signal is not spread out, but is instead transmitted over a wide range of 
frequencies that change at split second intervals”[12].  In order to do this, a “hopping” 
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table is established that both the transmitter and receiver follow.  They both jump from 
frequency to frequency in synchronization so that a jammer or interceptor would have a 
difficult time targeting a specific frequency. 
2.3 Bluetooth 
In late winter of 1998, five companies, Ericsson, IBM, Intel, Nokia, and Toshiba, 
jointly formed the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG).  The purpose of the Bluetooth 
SIG was “to develop and promote a global solution for short-range wireless 
communication operating in the unlicensed 2.4 GHz ISM (industrial, scientific, medical) 
band”[4].  The SIG elected to share all of the intellectual property of the new 
specification royalty-free in order to entice new members to join the SIG and adopt the 
technology into new products being introduced to the market. 
The selection of the name Bluetooth for the new standard “comes from the Danish 
king Harald Blåtand (Bluetooth)”[2] of the 10th century and who is believed to have 
united the Scandinavian people.  In the same way, Bluetooth aims to unite personal 
computing devices. 
By May of 1998 there were approximately 70 adopter members in the Bluetooth 
SIG.  The Bluetooth specification version 1.0A became publicly available in the summer 
of 1999 and is composed of two parts: “the core specification defining the radio 
characteristics and the communication protocols for exchanging data between devices 
over Bluetooth links”[2], and “the profile specification that defines how the Bluetooth 
protocols are to be used to realize a number of selected applications”[2].  Four additional 
members, 3Com, Lucent, Microsoft, and Motorola, joined the promoter group in 
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December of 1999 bringing the membership total to nine.  As of January 2002 there are 
over 2000 adopter members of the Bluetooth SIG. 
Bluetooth wireless technology is primarily aimed at replacing the interconnecting 
cables between many different personal devices.  These devices include cellular phones, 
personal digital assistants (PDAs), laptop computers, and digital cameras.  Many personal 
devices currently use proprietary connectors making it difficult to interconnect devices 
from different manufacturers.  Thus, Bluetooth is designed to be a flexible connector 
facilitating the connection of several different personal devices. 
Devices employing Bluetooth will “operate in the unlicensed ISM band at 2.4 
GHz and employ frequency-hopping (FH) spread spectrum technology to reduce 
interference and fading”[14].  Full-duplex transmission is accomplished using a Time-
Division Duplex (TDD) scheme and is capable of both data and voice transmissions.  Up 
to eight different devices are able to connect to each other to form a Wireless Personal 
Area Network (WPAN) referred to as a piconet.  One of the devices takes on the role of 
the “master” and the other seven are “slaves”.  Bluetooth WPANs are able to support 
asynchronous data links with each device in the WPAN and up to three synchronous 
voice links between the master and the slaves.  A WPAN range is 10 m with transmitter 
power at 1 mw.  This range is extendable up to 100 m by increasing the transmitter power 
to 100 mw. 
The ISM band in most countries includes the frequency range from 2400 to 
2483.5 MHz.  Bluetooth utilizes the RF channels from 2402 to 2480 MHz. Table 1 shows 
the frequency assignments currently in place.  
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Each channel has a spacing of 1 MHz resulting in 79 channels for transmission.  
The “Bluetooth radio hops from channel to channel at 1600 hops per second”[14], thus it 
moves from channel to channel every 625 msec.  The hopping sequence for each piconet 
is unique and is “determined using an algorithm based on the address (and clock) of the 
Bluetooth hub (master)”[14].  In order for a device to transmit in a particular piconet, it 
must first synchronize to this hopping sequence. 
Table 1.  Bluetooth International Frequency Bands [1] 
Area Frequency Band (GHz) Bluetooth Channels 
USA, Europe and most 
other countries 
2.400 – 2.4835 79 
Spain 2.445 – 2.475 23 
France 2.4465 – 2.4835 23 
 
A binary system of Gaussian Frequency Shift Keying (GFSK) is used for 
modulation by Bluetooth radios.  The main reason for using GFSK is its spectral 
efficiency over Frequency Shift Keying (FSK).  A Gaussian filter is placed in line with 
the FSK modulator to smooth out and shape the pulse thus narrowing the spectral width 
and limiting the out of band spectrum.  A logic “1” is represented by a positive frequency 
deviation and a “0” is represented by a negative frequency deviation.  Bluetooth supports 
a data transmission rate of 1 Mb/second.  Table 2 provides a comparison between IEEE 
802.11 and the Bluetooth specifications.  
The Bluetooth protocol stack consists of two categories: the transport and the 
middleware protocols.  This grouping suggested by [2] and is not part of the Bluetooth 
specification.  “The transport protocols comprise protocols developed exclusively for the 
Bluetooth wireless technology”.  All data communication between two Bluetooth devices 
involves the transport protocols.  Other adopter protocols and some Bluetooth specific 
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protocols comprise the middleware protocols.  These shield different applications, 
“legacy and new”, from the specifics of the Bluetooth transport protocols and allow them 
to exchange data utilizing Bluetooth wireless technology.  Although different 
applications “may run over different protocol stacks”[11], each of these protocols 
accesses the Bluetooth data link and physical layer.  Figure 1 shows a representation of 
the Bluetooth protocol stack. 
Table 2.  802.11b vs. Bluetooth [14] 
Comparison of IEEE 802.11 / 802.11b and Bluetooth Specifications 
Specification IEEE 802.11 / 802.11b Wireless 
LAN 
Bluetooth 
Applications/Market − Home 
− School 
− Enterprise 
− Ad Hoc networking 
− Campus-wide voice and data 
− Cable replacement 
− Ad Hoc networking 
− Personal area voice and 
LAN access 
Technology − 2.4 GHz ISM 
− Direct Sequence Spread 
Spectrum 
− Frequency Hopping Spread 
Spectrum 
− Infrared (IR) 
− 2.4 GHz ISM 
− Frequency Hopping 
Spread Spectrum; 1600 
hops per second 
Data Rate − Direct Sequence: 11 Mbps 
− Frequency Hopping: 1.2 
Mbps 
− 1 Mbps 
Power 20 dBm (typical) 0 dBm, 20 dBm 
Range 100 m 1-10 m at 0 dBm; 100 m at 20 
dBm 
Networking Topology Vendor dependent access points 
with client adapters; each access 
point supporting typically 128 
devices 
8 devices in a Piconet 
Separate Voice Channel Optional Yes 
Security Optional Wireless Equivalent 
Protection (WEP) 
Encryption, authentication 
 
The focus of the design of the Bluetooth protocols and the protocol stack is to 
maximize the re-use of existing protocols.  This helps ensure smooth interoperation and 
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interoperability of existing (legacy) applications.  Using this, “many applications already 
developed by vendors can take immediate advantage of hardware and software systems, 
which are compliant to the (Bluetooth) Specification”[11]. 
  
Figure 1.  Bluetooth Protocol Stack [11] 
 
2.3.1 Transport Protocol Layers 
2.3.1.1 Radio Layer 
The radio layer has already been addressed in the above paragraphs.   
2.3.1.2 Baseband Layer 
The baseband layer defines the physical RF link and how piconets are formed.  
The sharing of transmission resources among the devices of a piconet and low-level 
packet types are also defined by the baseband layer.  Both inquiry and paging procedures 
are used “to synchronize the transmission hopping frequency”[11] between devices in the 
piconet as well as their individual clocks.   
vCard/vCal 
OBEX 
WAE 
WAP 
PPP 
IP 
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SDP TCS BIN AT-
Commands 
RFCOMM 
Audio 
L2CAP 
LMP 
Bluetooth Radio 
Baseband 
TCP
Host Controller Interface 
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Two parameters are required for Bluetooth devices to talk to each other:  the 
Bluetooth device address (BD_ADDR) and the clock.  Each Bluetooth device has a 
unique IEEE-type 48-bit address assigned during manufacturing.  The address “is 
engraved on the Bluetooth hardware and it cannot be modified”[2].  The clock is a free 
running 28-bit counter.  It increments once every 312.5 microseconds, “which 
corresponds to half the residence time in a frequency when the radio hops at the nominal 
rate of 1,600 hops/sec”[2].  Once a Bluetooth device acquires these two parameters from 
another, they are able to communicate. 
Piconets are formed ad hoc without any infrastructure assistance.  The duration of 
a piconets existence is governed only by how long its master requires it and is able to 
communicate with other devices in the piconet.  Bluetooth devices in a piconet take on 
either the role of master or slave.  Only one master and up to seven slaves can exist 
relative to a particular piconet.  The slaves are defined by whom the master is actively 
communicating with.  More Bluetooth devices can be in a particular piconet, but only 
eight (one master and seven slaves) can be active at a given time.  Any “Bluetooth radio 
may serve either as master or slave at different times”[2].  When a new device joins a 
preexisting piconet it is initially a slave, but immediately upon joining the new device can 
negotiate to become the master. 
Each actively participating slave in a piconet is identified by a locally unique 
active member address (AM_ADDR) assigned by the master.  The master regulates and 
controls transmissions in the piconet.  Those devices in the piconet that are not active are 
considered parked.  If a device is not part of any piconet it is considered in stand-by 
mode.  Two or more piconets “can coexist in time and space independent of each 
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other”[2].  A Bluetooth device can join more than one piconet forming a scatternet.  
Figure 2 depicts a possible piconet and scatternet configuration. 
Members of a piconet 
communicate by following a 
sequence of frequency hops 
in a synchronized manner.  
Each transmit and receive 
time slot lasts 625 
microseconds, the duration of 
one nominal frequency hop.  
A transmission must begin 
and complete within a given 
slot.  The exception to this is when a packet occupies three or five slots.  To 
accommodate these multi-slot packets, hopping is suspended during transmission.  Upon 
completion of transmission, the hop frequency catches up to the frequency it would have 
been had only single-slot transmissions occurred. 
A slave can recreate the frequency hop sequence for a piconet by utilizing the 
Bluetooth address of the master device.  The master’s clock identifies the slot 
transmission frequency.  Thus for scatternets, a Bluetooth device can only be master in 
one piconet of the scatternet since it is the sole identifier of the communications channel 
for its piconet. 
The master’s Bluetooth clock governs the synchronization of the slaves.  Each 
slave maintains “the offset time between their own Bluetooth clock and that of their 
  
Figure 2.  Piconets and Scatternets [2] 
Sb 
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master”[2].  The value of the second least significant bit of the master’s Bluetooth clock 
identifies each transmission slot as either even or odd, since the clock ticks twice every 
625 microseconds.   
A time-division duplex (TDD) scheme is used to alternate between the master and 
the slave transmissions.  “The master transmits on the even numbered slots, as defined by 
the master’s Bluetooth clock, while the slaves transmit on odd numbered slots”[2].  A 
slave cannot transmit until it has received a transmission from the master.  Upon 
receiving the master’s transmission, the slave is free to transmit in the next time slot.  
Bluetooth devices are limited to transmitting and/or receiving in only one piconet at a 
time due to the different frequency hopping sequences, but a device may use non-
overlapping time intervals to time-share its participation in two or more piconets. 
In order for a device to acquire the BD_ADDR and clock of the master, two 
processes must occur: inquiry and paging.  “The inquiry process is a device discovery 
process during which the master of a future piconet discovers other devices in its 
vicinity”[2].  The master transmits inquiry messages to inform all devices in range of its 
presence.  Other Bluetooth devices in discovery mode perform an inquiry scan to search 
for inquiry messages and respond with a message containing their BD_ADDR. 
The master device now enters the paging process whereby it pages particular 
devices to join its piconet.  If the master is already aware of devices in its vicinity, it may 
skip the inquiry phase and simply page the device directly.  The receiver of the page may 
now join the piconet. 
Bluetooth supports two different links for transmission of packets: asynchronous 
connectionless (ACL) and synchronous connection-oriented (SCO).  ACL is best used for 
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asynchronous data traffic that requires a certain level of integrity.  This is accomplished 
through the use of retransmissions, sequence members, and forward error correction 
codes (FEC) if needed.  SCO is primarily for audio transmissions.  It transmits at 64 Kb/s 
in both directions for up to three links.  FEC may be used by SCO traffic to correct errors, 
but no SCO traffic is retransmitted. 
There are five different types of baseband packets as shown in Figure 3:  
 
Figure 3.  Baseband Packet Types [2] 
 
Identification (ID), POLL/NULL, Frequency-Hopping Sequence (FHS), ACL/SCO, and 
Data Voice (DV).  Each of these packet types contains “an access code (AC) field, which 
is used to distinguish transmissions in different piconets” [2].  Additionally, all have a 
header field except for the ID packet.  FHA, ACL/SCO, and DV also have a payload 
section.  Table 3 compares baseband packet types. 
AC 
AC 
AC 
AC 
AC 
BB header
BB header
BB header
BB header
FHS payload 
ACL or SCO payload 
ACL payload SCO payload
ID 
POLL/NULL 
DV 
ACL/SCO 
FHS 
LSB MSB
68 (bit-count) 
72 
72 
72 
72 
54 (1/3FEC)
54*(1/3FEC)
54 (1/3FEC)
54 (1/3FEC)
240 (2/3FEC) 
0-2744 ({1,2,3**}/3FEC) 
80 32-150 (2/3FEC)
(*) the bit counts include any FEC applied; (**) a 3/3 FEC implies no FEC 
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Table 3.  Baseband Packet Comparison 
Packet Type Purpose 
ID Inquiry searches; synchronization during pages 
POLL Explicitly poll a slave; no payload 
NULL Acknowledge a transmission; no payload 
FHS Creation of a piconet; passing address (BD_ADDR and AM_ADDR) and 
clock information; payload encoded using shortened Hamming code 
with rate 2/3  
ACL Asynchronous data; payload may be encoded using FEC with rate 2/3 or 
not at all 
SCO Synchronous data; payload may be encoded using FEC with rate 1/3 or 
2/3 
DV Contains both ACL and SCO data; transmitted as an SCO packet; used 
when ACL data need to be sent to the receiver of an SCO transmission 
 
Each packet consists of multiple fields as depicted in Figure 4.  The header 
contains the AM_ADDR, PDU_type, flags, and a header error check (HEC) code.  “The 
AM_ADDR field identifies the destination slave of a master transmission or the source 
slave of a slave transmission” [2].  Bluetooth supports broadcasting of packets to all the 
slaves from the master by setting the AM_ADDR = b’000’.  The slaves are not required to 
acknowledge receipt and no broadcast message is repeated.  The PDU_type field 
identifies packet type.  Transmission and retransmission of ACL packets is controlled by 
the flags using “a stop-and-go ARQ scheme and a 1-bit sequence number” [4] and flow 
control.  The HEC provides an 8-bit code for protecting the header from errors. 
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Figure 4.  Baseband Packet Fields [2] 
 
The ACL payload (Figure 5) consists of a header (ACL_pld_hdr), the body 
(ACL_pld_body), and a 16-bit cyclic redundancy check (CRC).  The header contains a 
logical channel (L_CH) field for the transmission.  If L_CH = b’11’ the body “is passed 
to the link manager and is used for the configuration of the Bluetooth link”[2].  For 
L_CH = b’01’ or b’10’ L2CAP is the recipient of the body. 
 
Figure 5.  ACL Packet Payload Format [2] 
 
AC 
BB header 
SCO payload 
ACL payload 
preamble synch word trailer
SCO data
ACL pld hdr
72 
454*(1/3FEC) 
({2,3*}/3) FEC applied whenever appropriate
AM ADDR PDU type flags(**) HEC 
ACL pld body CRC 
(*) a 3/3 FEC implies no FEC 
({1,2,3*}/3) FEC applied whenever appropriate
3 3 8 
4 68 4
(**) flags: | flow | ARQ | SEQN |
LSB MSB 
ACL pld hdr ACL pld body
1 (or 2) octets 0 to 339 octets
lengthflow L CH reserved(**)
2 1 5 or 9(*) (bit-count) 
(*) for multislot baseband packets 
(**) present only when length is 9 bits 
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2.3.1.3 Link Manager Protocol 
The Link Manager Protocol (LMP) handles link management.  LMP is a 
transactional protocol that sets up the properties of a Bluetooth link.  A “device may 
authenticate another device through a challenge/response mechanism” [2].  Once a device 
has been authenticated, the link between them may be encrypted.  The link managers of 
different devices negotiate with each other to learn the other’s features.  The LMP is used 
to establish SCO connections, polling intervals, and packet sizes for transmissions 
between two devices. 
One-slot ACL packets (c.f., Figure 6) with logical channel L_CH = b’11’ carry 
the LMP packets.  The LMP packet header is 8-bits in length with the first bit signifying 
the transaction ID (tr_ID).  The tr_ID = b’0’ if the master is the initiator and b’1’ if the 
slave initiated the transaction.  
Authentication and encryption algorithms both reside in the baseband, but the act 
of authenticating and encrypting are part of the LMP.  Authentication “is based on a 
challenge/response mechanism based on a commonly shared secret, a link key generated 
through a user-provided PIN” [2].  Anytime throughout the duration of a connection a 
device may authenticate with another.  It is initiated by one device transmitting an LMP 
challenge packet.  The challenger generates a random number that is included in the 
challenge packet.  The claimant receives the packet and operates on it using an 
authentication key of 128-bits.  The claimant then returns the result to the challenger who 
compares it with the expected outcome.  A correct comparison verifies the identity of the 
claimant. 
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After authentication the link may be encrypted to further enhance the security of 
the link.  The linked Bluetooth devices generate a sequence of encryption keys from the 
link key.  “The encryption key changes with each packet transmission” [2].  Depending 
on the government regulation for the country where the Bluetooth devices are operating, 
the encryption key may be as large as 128 bits.  The SAFER+ algorithm is used to 
generate both the encryption and authentication keys.  If a link is encrypted, both 
asynchronous and synchronous transmissions are encrypted. 
 
Low power modes for a Bluetooth device also reside in the baseband, but are 
configured and activated through LMP transactions.  The low power modes for a 
Bluetooth device are the sniff, hold, and park modes.  Sniff mode is the state of a slave 
who listens for a master transmission periodically per an agreement with the master.  
LMP transactions are used to configure the exact period between listenings.  The hold 
mode is used when “a device agrees with its communication partner in a piconet to 
remain silent for a given amount of time” [2].  A holding device maintains its active 
member address, AM_ADDR.   
 
Figure 6.  LMP packet format [4] 
LSB MSB 
ACL pld hdr ACL pld body
1 octet 2 to 17 octets
opCodetr IDL CH = b’11’ LMP payload
2 1 7 8-128 (bit-count) 
LMP packets are encoded with a 2/3 rate FEC
LMP header
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In park mode the slave device relinquishes its AM_ADDR.  The slave device is 
then silent until notified by the master that it can rejoin the piconet.  The slave listens 
periodically for a beacon transmission broadcasted by the master.  If the slave wants to 
unpark and rejoin the piconet it sends “a message to the master in the slots following the 
beacon instant” [2].  Even though the device is in a low power mode it can still 
accomplish other operations, thus low power mode only limits transmissions within a 
particular piconet. 
2.3.1.4 Host Controller Interface 
The Host Controller Interface (HCI) resides between the lower layers of the 
Bluetooth stack and the host device.  The HCI is not a protocol, but an interface used by 
the host device to send data intended for or receive data from other Bluetooth devices.  
Link creation to specific devices, inquiry execution, authentication requests, low power 
mode activation and so forth can be accomplished by the host device though the HCI.  
“The HCI provides a uniform command method of accessing the Bluetooth hardware 
capabilities” [4].  In general terms, the only way to talk to the hardware is through the 
HCI command set.  The capabilities of the hardware available to applications are limited 
to those provided by the HCI. 
2.3.1.5 Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol 
Just above the HCI in the Bluetooth protocol stack is the Logical Link Control 
and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP).  The implementation details of the lower layer are 
hidden from the higher layers by the L2CAP.  “At the L2CAP layer, the concepts of 
master and slave devices” [2] no longer exist.  Multiple logical channels are multiplexed 
over the ACL links of a device via the L2CAP.  Hence, a master device can communicate 
 
24 
 
with multiple slaves within its piconet.  L2CAP provides no support for SCO links.  
Audio transmitted over an SCO link is sent directly to the baseband layer.   
Segmentation and reassembly of large L2CAP packets is supported.  L2CAP 
packet format is shown in Figure 7.  If a packet is segmented, the L_CH field of the 
ACL_pkt_hdr is set to b’10’ to identify the first segment and b’01’ for the rest of the 
segments. 
 
Figure 7.  L2CAP Packet Format [2] 
 
Traffic flow for the L2CAP is over logical connectionless or connection-oriented 
channels.  Each channel has a two-octet channel identifier (CID) that is unique within 
each device.  A CID of 0x’0001’ identifies the signaling channel for a connection-
oriented channel.  CID value 0x’0002’ is reserved for the connectionless channel. 
Each L2CAP packet consists of a 4-octet header (L2CAP_hdr) and a payload 
section of up to 65,535 octets depending on the capabilities of the host device.  L2CAP 
packets have three different payload formats depending on the CID.  For signaling 
packets the payload is separated into four fields identified in Table 4. 
L2CAP hdr L2CAP payload 
4 octets 0 to 65,535 octets 
identifieropCode
length 
length
2 
1 1 2
(octet-count) 
a) dst_CID = 0x’0001’ (signaling channel) 
b) dst_CID = 0x’0002’ (connectionless channel) 
c) dst CID > 0x’0002’ (connection-oriented channel)
dst CID
2 
sgnl data 
PSM
CO payload
CL payload 
2
….
(a)
(b)
(c)
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Table 4.  L2CAP Signaling Packet Payload 
Field Length Purpose 
opCode 1 octet Identify the particular signaling 
data 
indentifier 1 octet Match requests and responses 
length 2 octets Length of data field 
signaling data 
(sgnl_data) 
Defined by previous length field Contains the signaling data 
 
A connectionless L2CAP packet consists of a PSM field used for “protocol 
multiplexing in L2CAP channels” [2].  The PSM field is incorporated into the signaling 
data of a connection request for connection-oriented channels. 
2.3.2 Middleware Protocols 
2.3.2.1 Service Directory Protocol 
Bluetooth is designed to support a multitude of applications.  In order for devices 
to determine what another device has to offer a Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) is 
utilized.  Devices can inquire each other to determine what services are offered on the 
device and how to access them.  No services can be accessed directly through the SDP; it 
is solely an information provider.  A universally unique identifier (UUID), typically 128 
bits in length, identifies each service and its attributes.  Smaller 16-bit and 32-bit UUIDs 
may be used for known services. 
2.3.2.2 Radio Frequency Communication 
The RFCOMM protocol provides serial line emulation based on the ETSI 07.10 
specification [4].  RFCOMM “emulates RS-232 control and data signals over the 
Bluetooth baseband” [11].  This allows legacy applications that use serial lines as their 
transport mechanism to operate unmodified on a Bluetooth link. 
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2.3.2.3 Telephony Control Signaling 
The Telephony Control Signaling (TCS) protocol consists of the AT command set 
(TCS-AT) and Binary (TCS-BIN).  RFCOMM enables use of the AT command set since 
they are designed to be passed over serial lines.  Through AT commands a mobile phone 
or modem can be controlled.  TCS-AT is based on ITU-T Recommendation V.250 and 
ETS 300 916 (GSM 07.07).  TCS-BIN is a binary encoding of information “that runs 
directly on top of L2CAP” [4] and “supports normal telephony control functions such as 
placing and terminating a call, and sensing ringing tones” [2].  Additionally, TCS-BIN 
handles point-to-multipoint communication. 
2.3.2.4 Adopted Protocols 
Bluetooth supports additional industry standard protocols including point-to-point 
(PPP), transport control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP), IrOBEX, and WAP [2].  
Thus, Bluetooth is a very flexible specification designed to support new as well as legacy 
applications and provide flexible communication between many devices. 
2.4 Wireless Security Issues 
Security is important in any network and includes the following areas: availability, 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and nonrepudiation. 
• Availability of a network describes on the survivability of network services even 
when under a denial-of-service attack.  A denial-of-service attack may be 
employed against any layer of a network from physical jamming to routing 
protocol disruption to crashing high-level services. 
 
• “Confidentiality ensures that certain information is never disclosed to 
unauthorized entities” [6].  Sensitive information that is transmitted requires 
confidentiality because the information might be valuable to an enemy. 
 
• Integrity ensures that a transferred message is not corrupted.  Corruption can 
occur due to benign failures or due to malicious attacks. 
 
 
27 
 
• Authentication guarantees identity of peers on a network.  An adversary may 
masquerade as another node thereby gaining “unauthorized access to resources 
and sensitive information” [6] or interfering with other nodes on the network. 
 
• Nonrepudiation prevents the sender of a message from denying that they ever sent 
the message. 
 
Security in a wireless environment presents certain challenges.  Wireless 
networks are “susceptible to link attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping to active 
impersonation, message replay, and message distortion” [6].  An eavesdropping 
adversary may gain access to private information violating confidentiality.  Through 
active attacks, an adversary may delete messages, send erroneous messages, modify data, 
or impersonate a node.  This violates availability, integrity, authentication, and 
nonrepudiation. 
In order to ensure survivability, a network needs to be distributed in nature.  
Central control points in a network introduce a significant vulnerability.  Wireless 
networks can also be dynamic in nature where frequent changes in membership of a 
network and the overall topology occur on a regular basis.  Trust between nodes moving 
in and out of different networks is an important issue.  Security of a wireless network 
must take all of these items into account in order to provide a robust defense. 
2.5 Bluetooth Security Issues 
Bluetooth has some basic weaknesses in security [9].  These vulnerabilities fall 
into the following categories: Eavesdropping and Impersonation, Location and 
Correlation, and Cipher Vulnerabilities.   
2.5.1 Eavesdropping and Impersonation 
Eavesdropping and Impersonation attacks both rely on capturing the initialization 
key used to encrypt and decrypt link key generation protocol information.  The 
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initialization key is computed using a PIN, a random number, and the claimant’s 
Bluetooth address.  The claimant’s address and the random number are both transmitted 
in the clear. The attacker will know the PIN if a default PIN of zero is used or if the PIN 
is transmitted in the clear.  Otherwise, the attacker needs to perform an exhaustive search 
of all possible PINs (feasible if a medium or small length PIN is used).   
Offline PIN crunching can be used in two scenarios.  In the first “the attacker 
exhaustively guesses all PINs up to a certain length” [9].  The attacker then validates the 
guess is correct by performing the initialization key protocol verification step.  This 
process is repeated until a correct result is found.  This attack is referred to as 
eavesdropping. 
For the second scenario, stealing by participation, the attacker begins with one 
PIN guess and performs the first part of initialization with the victim.  The attacker then 
initiates the first round of the challenge-response protocol.  The challenge-response 
transcript is then used to verify the guessed PIN.  The attacker repeats verification until a 
guessed PIN outputs ‘correct’.  The key establishment protocol then continues with the 
verified PIN.  Bluetooth uses an exponential back-off method to counter PIN guessing, 
but this only provides the attacker with more time to generate and verify PINs. 
Both the link and optional encryption keys are generated from the initialization 
key so the initialization key security is crucial.  In low memory mode, the unit key of a 
device is used as the link key.  Thus, an attacker may be able to obtain a device’s unit key 
via one of the above methods or by initiating contact with the device.  Once a device’s 
unit key is discovered, the attacker can impersonate the device and get the resulting link 
key. 
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Once an attacker has obtained the link key used by two devices, the attacker may 
perform a man-in-the-middle attack.  The attacker contacts both devices that have 
completed communication using the aforementioned link key and establishes new link 
keys with both of them.  Both of the previously communicating devices think they are 
talking to each other again and that the other started the session.  The attacker negotiates 
with both to become masters or slaves.  Both devices must be the same (master or slave) 
in order for the attacker to communicate with them since they must follow different hop 
sequences.  Hence, the two victim devices will not see each other’s transmissions.  The 
attacker is now impersonating two devices to each other. 
2.5.2 Location Attacks 
Devices in discovery mode respond to inquiries with their BD_ADDR.  Thereby, 
“an attacker can determine the location and movements of victim devices by maintaining 
geographically distributed devices that continuously inquire all devices entering within 
their reach, and recording the identities given in the response” [9].  If a Bluetooth device 
owner’s identity is known, it can be tied to the device identity.  Since the BD_ADDR is a 
permanent address assigned at the time of manufacture, an attacker can determine their 
movements and associations with other devices with a certain level of certainty. 
Given that a device switches between different modes (sniff, hold, and park 
modes) in the application layer (namely the LMP) an attacker may take control of a 
victim’s Bluetooth device through corrupt software (or some other means) and induce the 
device to scan for other devices in its area.  Thus, the victim device will reveal its identity 
to these devices as it moves through their transmission range. 
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The master using its own BD_ADDR deterministically computes the Channel 
Access Code (CAC) for each channel.  An attacker “listening on the baseband can 
determine the CAC associated with each (intercepted) message” [9].  Victims can then be 
indexed by their CACs and the relationship between device identifiers and CACs can be 
determined. 
2.5.3 Hopping Along 
Bluetooth conversations within a piconet frequency hop over 79 bands in the USA 
(23 bands in Spain and France).  An attacker must listen to each and every band at the 
same time or hop synchronously with the master and slave holding a conversation.  For 
an attacker to hop synchronously it must first identify the seed used for generating the 
hop sequence. 
How the seed is generated depends on the device state.  “In the inquiry (page) 
substate, the seed is deterministically derived from the inquiring device’s own clock and 
the general inquiry access code” [9] (GIAC common to all devices).  This differs from 
the connection substate where the master’s clock and BD_ADDR determine the seed.  
Thirty-two (32) dedicated bands are used for inquiry and a responding device transmits 
its clock and BD_ADDR.  An attacker can scan the inquiry bands and eavesdrop on the 
response messages.  Furthermore, the master transmits its clock and BD_ADDR during 
paging, thus allowing the attacker to determine the hopping sequence seed. 
2.5.4 Cipher Attacks 
The encryption cipher is generated using the “encryption key KC, the 48-bit 
BD_ADDR, the master clock bits CLK26-1, and a 128-bit RAND value” [4].  Four linear 
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feedback shift registers (LFSR) of size 25, 31, 33, and 39 bits are loaded with an initial 
value derived from the four above inputs.  From these the cipher is computed.   
“An attacker can guess the content of the registers of the three smaller LFSRs and 
the summation register with probability of 2-93” [9].  The contents of the 39-bit register 
can be reverse engineered from the output to the others.  Actual and generated outputs are 
compared to ascertain the correctness of the guess.  This requires approximately 128 bits 
of ciphertext and known plaintext that can be obtained easily (sending a message to a 
phone and eavesdropping on the transmission to a headset).  “Reverse engineering and 
verification takes approximately 27 bit operations, making the total complexity of the 
attack 2100, which is less than the complexity of 2128 encryptions for a brute force attack” 
[9].  Only one frame is transmitted per key, thus the key is only good for that frame.  By 
applying the attack twice, the master key can be obtained since the frame key is 
computed in the same manner as the sequence. 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter reviewed several topics necessary for a fundamental understanding 
of Bluetooth.  First, wireless communications and the IEEE 802.11 family of standards 
were discussed.  Additionally, transmission methods such as spread spectrum are 
introduced.  Second, Bluetooth and its protocol stack were discussed in detail.  Third, 
security issues for wireless communication were outlined.  Finally, currently known 
Bluetooth specific security issues were discussed.  The next chapter defines the 
experiment methodology. 
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3.  Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the problem definition, specific research objectives, and a 
solution methodology.  First, the problem definition is discussed including the reason for 
this research.  Second, the objectives are presented followed by discussion of the Linux 
script developed.  Finally, a solution methodology is presented in detail to include the 
system boundaries and parameters, evaluation technique, and experiment design and 
validation. 
3.2 Problem Definition 
DoD and Air Force installations continually incorporate new technology into the 
workplace to improve effectiveness and efficiency.  Office devices utilizing Bluetooth 
technology simplify device configuration and communication.  However, the Bluetooth 
protocol has security weaknesses as discussed in Chapter 2.  Although these security 
weaknesses are not easily exploited, they are a cause for concern.  When a weakness 
cannot be eliminated, it must be managed to minimize the possible effects of its 
exploitation. 
The simplest way to manage the security weaknesses of the Bluetooth protocol is 
to minimize the possibility of packet transmission interception.  This is accomplished by 
limiting the physical radius of transmission to within the boundaries of a controlled area.  
If transmissions are not receivable outside the controlled area, and the personnel and 
equipment within the controlled area are trusted, then the possibility of unauthorized 
packet interception is minimized.  Thus, the need for defined transmission reception 
ranges of Bluetooth piconets is clear. 
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Currently there are multiple software programs for IEEE 802.11b that capture 
packets and map the reception ranges of multiple transmitters.  This same functionality is 
desired for the Bluetooth protocol.  Initially the Bluetooth experiments modeled those 
performed for the analysis of IEEE 802.11b.  As an older standard, many different 
applications exist for the capture and analysis of 802.11b traffic.  Kismet is one such 
application.   
Kismet (http://www.kismetwireless.net) is a packet-capture application (i.e. a 
sniffer) that intercepts and records all packets it receives.  This is accomplished passively.  
That is, no transmissions by the monitoring hardware are made.  Additionally, Kismet 
provides the ability to record the GPS coordinates where the packet is intercepted and 
also records the power level of the received transmission.  With this information, Kismet 
maps the power level of intercepted packet transmissions and displays them on screen in 
zones (red, yellow, and green) indicating the received power levels.  The received power 
level correlates to an expected bit error rate based on the type of keying used for the 
transmission. 
The original focus of this research was to develop a capability similar to Kismet 
for Bluetooth transmissions.  After further analysis of the Bluetooth protocol and 
comparison to the IEEE 802.11b standard, it became clear that this could not be 
accomplished within the time allocated for this study.  The following discussion is a 
summary of the findings that precluded the implementation of a Kismet-like tool for 
Bluetooth during this investigation.  
First, to receive Bluetooth transmissions, the receiver must synchronize to the 
frequency hopping sequence of the piconet master.  This differs from an 802.11b 
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transmission, which does not require explicit synchronization with a master.  Each 
channel in 802.11b uses the same spreading sequence so a sniffer need only listen to a 
particular channel to intercept the packet transmissions.  For a Bluetooth packet 
transmission, the exact frequency of transmission is only known if the frequency hopping 
sequence of the master is known.  Thus a receiver cannot synchronize and listen in if it 
does not have the information needed, namely the BD_ADDR and clock of the master as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  If the monitor wishes to remain passive, a method for 
determining the frequency hop sequence of the master without active participation in the 
piconet needs to be developed.  This is not the focus of this study and is left as a follow-
on research topic. 
Second, according to the Bluetooth specification, the functional distance of a 
Level 3 Power Class Bluetooth transmitter is 10 m.  This is much less than the range of 
802.11b transmissions.  The IEEE 802.11b transmissions are dependent on antenna type 
and can reach distances of more than a mile.  Furthermore, the accuracy of a GPS unit is 
typically less the 15 m (3-5 m for Differential GPS (DGPS)).  Thus, the use of GPS 
coordinates for tracking Bluetooth transmissions is not reasonable within the context of 
this study.  Table 5 lists the power classes of Bluetooth devices and their respective 
output power levels. 
Table 5.  Bluetooth Transmission Power Classes [4] 
Power  
Class 
Maximum Output  
Power (Pmax) 
Nominal  
Output Power 
Minimum  
Output Power Power Control 
1 100 mW (20dBm) N/A 1 mW (0 dBm) 
Pmin<+4 dBm to Pmax 
Optional: 
Pmin to Pmax 
2 2.5 mW (4 dBm) 1 mW (0 dBm) 0.25 mW (-6 dBm) Optional: Pmin to Pmax 
3 1 mW (0 DbM) N/A N/A Optional: Pmin to Pmax 
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Third, 802.11b hardware has the capability to return power level values for the 
received signal.  This capability is used by Kismet to track the power of intercepted 
packets.  The Bluetooth hardware, specifically the baseband and radio layers, are 
accessed through the Host Controller Interface.  The Bluetooth specification defines a 
basic command set that the interface provides (some chipset manufacturers provide 
additional commands specific to their hardware).  The only function dealing with 
received power level is the optional implementation of the Receiver Signal Strength 
Indicator (RSSI).  The RSSI does not return an explicit received power level value.  The 
RSSI returns an approximation of the transmission deviation from the Golden Receive 
Range (c.f., Section 3.3.4).  This RSSI is primarily for Bluetooth transmitters that 
incorporate power control and can vary transmission strength in response to a receiver 
request to increase or decrease power.  
Given these limitations, it is not feasible to pursue development of Bluetooth 
capture software similar to Kismet.  This is not to say that it cannot be accomplished, but 
it is outside the scope of this study.  
The low transmission power of Bluetooth devices limits the range over which two 
devices can communicate.  The 10 m range in the Bluetooth specification is assumed to 
be a maximum line-of-sight distance between two devices.  It cannot be assumed that this 
is the maximum distance at which Bluetooth transmissions can be reliably received or 
intercepted.  As the use of Bluetooth increases, more and more information will be 
communicated wirelessly and the need for securing that information becomes more 
pronounced. 
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3.3.1 Research Objectives 
The primary objectives of this study are to determine the following: 
1. The transmitter/receiver antenna orientation that provides the best reception 
for a commonly used configuration. 
2. The ranges at which fixed levels of throughput can be received. 
It is expected that the received signal power will decrease as the distance between 
the transmitter and receiver increases.  This power decrease is due to path loss and 
destructive interference caused by reflected transmission signals.  It is expected that 
changing the relative orientation of the receiver and transmitter antennas will cause an 
increase or decrease in the received signal power; this is dependent on which orientation 
is used for the initial measurement.  Increasing distance is expected to decrease the 
throughput level.  This decrease is due to path loss, and hence bit errors are likely to be in 
the signal.  The decrease in throughput is not expected to occur at the same rate as 
received signal power within Bluetooth’s specified 10 m functional range.  Instead, the 
throughput should gradually decrease with more dramatic decreases at greater separation 
distances. 
To achieve the research goals of this study, a Linux script is developed to utilize 
the functionality provided by the HCI for accessing the RSSI.  Measurements of RSSI 
and throughput for transmissions in a free-space environment are recorded.  This data is 
analyzed to determine the correlation between received power level, antenna orientation, 
and throughput range. 
3.3.2 System Boundaries 
The System Under Test (SUT) consists of those components required for wireless 
communication.  These components are a transmitter, a transmission medium, and a 
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receiver, as shown in Figure 8.  Data packets are sent to the transmitter and constitute the 
offered load.  The transmitter places the packet onto the medium.  The medium carries 
the packet transmission to the receiver.  The receiver receives the packets and sends them 
out of the system.  The Components Under Test (CUTs) are the transmitter antenna, the 
transmission medium, and the receiver antenna.  The transmission medium is assumed to 
be free-space. 
 
Figure 8.  System and Component Under Test 
 
This study is limited to only considering relative antenna orientation in 90-degree 
increments.  Additionally, the study is limited to outdoor transmissions and free-space 
propagation.  The transmission power level is set at 1 mw.  It is infeasible to determine 
ranges for every Bluetooth communication mode.  Therefore, the experiment is limited to 
File Transfer Protocol (FTP) traffic using the Data Medium rate 5-slot (DM5) packet 
type.  This packet type has a theoretical maximum forward (asymmetric) throughput rate 
of 477.8 kbps [3].  Additionally, it is assumed that there is no interference due to other 
transmissions. 
3.3.3 System Services 
The system provides one service – wireless transmission of data from a 
transmitter to a receiver.  The possible outcomes of this service are success and failure.  
A successful outcome occurs when the received transmission is error free or is 
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correctable by the FEC or CRC.  Everything else is a failure.  Failure consists of the 
following possibilities: 
• No transmission is received – the signal power level is below a certain reception 
threshold (threshold varies vendor to vendor), or 
• Transmission is received, but with errors – errors beyond the correction capability 
of the FEC or CRC 
3.3.4 Performance Metrics 
The performance metrics are throughput and RSSI.  The size of the data (in bits) 
divided by the total time taken to receive the data defines throughput.  Throughput 
provides a measure of network capacity and indicates how many transmissions can be 
successfully sent under a given set of circumstances. 
The Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) is an optional capability for 
transceivers to support power-control links.  It provides the means “to measure the 
strength of the received signal and determine if the transmitter on the other side of the 
link should increase or decrease its output power level” [4]. 
Each Bluetooth receiver has a Golden Receive Range defined by two thresholds.  
The lower threshold “corresponds to a received power between –56 dBm and 6 dB above 
the actual sensitivity of the receiver” [4], which is defined as a minimum of –70 dBm 
with a raw bit error rate (BER) of 10-3.  The upper threshold falls in the range of 14 dB to 
26 dB above the lower threshold as depicted in Figure 9.  
The RSSI value is a whole number indicator in decibels (dB) of the approximate 
location (above or below) of the received signal strength relative to the Golden Receive 
Range.  When the received signal strength is within the Golden Receive Range, the RSSI 
returns a value of zero.  “The Golden Receive Power Range is normally around 20 dBm 
wide, crudely equating to a physical range factor of ten” [5].  Thus, the returned RSSI 
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value can be zero for transmissions in the range of 1 m to 10 m.  This corresponds to the 
10 m operational range of Bluetooth devices as outlined in the specification.   
 
Figure 9.  RSSI Dynamic Range and Accuracy 
 
The RSSI returns a positive or negative value only when the received signal 
strength is outside of the Golden Receive Range.  A positive value indicates the received 
signal power is above the Golden Receive Range, while a negative value indicates the 
received signal power below the Golden Receive Range.  Positive values are approximate 
decibel (dB) values between the upper Golden Range threshold and the actual received 
signal strength.  Negative values are approximate decibel (dB) values between the actual 
received signal strength and the lower Golden Range threshold.  All RSSI values are 
approximate and “can be more than ±5 dB from the real value” [5].  Negative values are 
clipped to a minimum of –10 dB for CSR chipsets and –15 dB for Ericsson chipsets. 
3.3.5 Parameters 
System parameters for this experiment are as follows: 
• Temperature – Temperature inversion can cause reflection of radio waves and 
signal loss 
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• Humidity – Attenuation due to the density of water in the air, this is due to the 
close proximity of the transmitted frequency to the resonance frequency of water 
molecules 
• Wind – Wind can cause constant changes in air temperature and humidity thus 
leading to unpredictable signal loss  
• Antenna orientation – The antenna gain pattern (directivity) may affect received 
signal power and throughput 
• Transmitter distance from receiver – The path loss due to propagation through 
free-space lowers signal power and may hinder reception 
• Electromagnetic interference (EMI) – Both natural and man-made EMI can occur, 
such as transmissions at the same frequency by other broadcasting radio devices, 
microwave ovens, and radiation  
Workload parameters are as follows: 
• Packet type – The theoretical throughput limit of transmitted DM5 packets is 
477.8 kbps in a piconet having only a master and one slave.  Different packet 
types have an effect on the throughput 
3.3.6 Factors 
The factors and corresponding values for this experiment are:  
• Antenna orientation – (90-degree, 180-degree, 270-degree, and 360-degree) – 
Transmitter/receiver antenna orientations are selected based on the minimum 
number of different orientations needed to measure 360-degrees around the 
transmitter or receiver  
• Transmitter distance from receiver – (1 meter increments for RSSI until lower 
threshold is reached, 5 meter increments for throughput with 1 meter refinements) 
– Distances for RSSI measurement are based on the narrow range over which the 
RSSI is expected to be useful.  Distances for throughput are based on initial rough 
measures and refined as needed 
The antenna orientations selected reflect the different axis in a two-dimensional 
plane.  It is expected that the gain of the micro-strip patch antenna is not equal in all 
directions.  It is expected that orientations aligning the primary lobes will produce the 
best RSSI values and throughput rate. 
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The distance between the transmitter and receiver is expected to be the primary 
contributor to the decrease in RSSI value and throughput rate.  This is due to transmission 
path attenuation. 
3.4.1 Evaluation Technique 
The experiment is conducted using direct system measurement.  This technique is 
selected due to the unknown nature of the effects of the factors and the availability of a 
Bluetooth testbed.  Direct measurement of Bluetooth transmissions provides the simplest 
means for determining a possible correlation between the factors and the performance 
metrics.  Measurement also provides the most accurate representation of real world 
scenarios.   
The results of implementing a measurement technique will be validated using the 
path loss analytical model for radio frequency transmissions in open-air.  The analytical 
model provides an easy, quick, low-cost method for validating the measurements.  The 
lower accuracy of the analytical model eliminates it from being the primary evaluation 
method for this experiment.  The accuracy of the analytical model is low due to the 
unknown nature of the environments the transmissions may occur in.  It requires too 
many assumptions and simplifications to result in the desired level of accuracy. 
3.4.2 Workload 
The components under test are the transmission distance and the orientation of the 
antenna.  The distance the signal travels is measured from the closest edge of the 
transmitting antenna to closest edge of the receiving antenna.  The power level of the 
signal is set at 1 mw.  For the orientation experiment, there is no load on the system.  The 
RSSI command measures the signal strength of the current packet.  In the orientation 
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experiment, a connection is established, but no data is sent during the test.  The packets 
are limited to polling packets between the piconet master and slave.   
For the throughput experiment, a 1001 KB JPEG file is sent from the transmitter 
to the receiver via the file transfer protocol.  The file size of 1001 KB is selected simply 
for ease of throughput calculation and convenience (the file is already on hand).  An 
approximately 1 MB file eases mental calculations of throughput estimates during the 
experiment execution.  The size of approximately 1 MB provides enough time to 
determine an accurate throughput measurement.  The theoretical minimum amount of 
time to transmit the file is ( ) s
kbps
bytebitsKB 76.16
8.477
/81001
= . 
The file transfer protocol software accompanying the Bluetooth cards used in the 
experiments utilizes DM5 packets.  A constant workload of DM5 packet transmissions 
provides a good means of measuring the throughput.  The workload consists of DM5 
packets broadcast until the file transfer is complete and acknowledged. 
3.4.3 Experimental Design 
The experimental design for the orientation experiment is a two factor full 
factorial design with replications.  A two factor full factorial design allows separation of 
the interactions from experimental errors.  Since RSSI values are integers, it is clear that 
the hardware is either rounding or truncating the actual signal strength.  In order to give a 
better estimate of the difference between received signal strength and Golden Range 
threshold, 100 samples for each orientation and distance are averaged.  The number of 
required experiments, n, using a two factor full factorial design with replications is: 
n = abr = (4 orientations)(21 distances)(100 replications) = 8400 (1) 
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The advantage of this design is that every possible combination of configuration 
is examined.  The effect of every factor and their interaction can be determined.  
Additionally, a confidence interval for experimental errors can be determined for a 
selected confidence level.   
Each experiment consists of a unique combination of the factors and 
corresponding levels.  A baseline RSSI lower threshold maximum range determination is 
made using free-space transmissions and the Bluetooth PC card manufacturer’s original 
unmodified hardware.  This range is the maximum range at which the RSSI value is 
above the lower threshold of –15 dB for the Ericsson chipset used. 
The experimental design for the throughput experiment is a two factor full 
factorial design with replications.  Since throughput is expected to decrease at different 
ranges for different orientations, the connection between the master and slave will fail 
and data will not be collected beyond that distance for that orientation.  Thus, there is no 
way to compare results between orientations.  Therefore, the best-case measurement is 
used.  Each experiment is performed r times and the best result is selected as the sample 
value. 
Although this is a best-case measurement, how close this measure is to the best-
case mean is of interest.  Assuming the errors are normally distributed, the number of 
replications, r, required is given by solving the mean confidence interval equation for r 





=
100
1 ax
r
szx mm  (2) 
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where x  is the mean of the baseline sample, z is the normal variate for the desired 
confidence level, s is sample standard deviation, and a is the desired accuracy of the 
confidence interval.  
A baseline throughput measured in the lab at a distance of 2 m identified little 
variation between measurements (Table 6).  The transmitter and receiver are both placed 
on desktops at a height of 0.6584375 m.  Both the transmitter and receiver are placed at 
the 90-degree orientation with respect to each other.   
Table 6.  Lab Sample Throughput Values 
File Transfer Time (sec) Calculated Throughput (kbps)
26.46 302.63 
26.53 301.75 
26.62 300.73 
Mean =  301.70 
Std. Dev. =  0.77 
 
A confidence level of 95% is selected since the throughput loss is high with respect to the 
change in distance compared to the throughput gain.  This high loss is due to the short 
distance over which Bluetooth devices are designed to function.  Choosing a confidence 
level of 95% gives a = 5 and z = 1.645. 
Although the calculated number of replications required is less than one due to the 
small standard deviation in the measured throughput, three replications per measurement 
are performed. 
3.5 Result Analysis and Interpretation 
 Once orientation data is collected, the effects of selected factors are quantified 
using ANOVA.  The ratio of the Mean Square of factor x (MSx) and the Mean Square of 
Error (MSE) is calculated, where MSx is given by SSx divided by degrees of freedom 
and MSE is given by dividing the sum of squares for error by its degrees of freedom.  
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This ratio is compared to the F-distribution F(n, m) using SSx degrees of freedom for n 
and SSE degrees of freedom for m.  If MSx/MSE ≥ the F(n, m) table value, the effect of 
factor x is statistically significant with respect to the error. 
 For either factor, if the confidence intervals overlap for different levels, then the 
number of replications of that experiment is increased.  The number of additional 
replications is determined from the previously gathered data for that factor.  By equating 
the lower bound of the higher factor level with the upper bound of the lower factor level 
and solving for number of observations, the number of additional replications needed to 
separate the overlapping confidence intervals is determined. 
3.6 Summary 
 The experiment outlined in this chapter is intended to determine a preferred 
receiver antenna orientation.  Then, using that orientation to determine ranges for fixed 
throughput levels.  Factors considered include receiver antenna orientation and distance 
the signal travels.  ANOVA is used to determine factor contribution to variation and 
determine confidence intervals of measured data. 
 It is expected that distance, rather than antenna orientation is the primary 
contributing factor to RSSI variation.  As the distance between the transmitter and 
receiver increases, the RSSI value and throughput will decrease.  The RSSI value 
decrease is expected to follow that of the path loss equation, whereas throughput will 
drop off slowly at first and more quickly at greater ranges.  The orientation of the antenna 
is expected to contribute to the variation in measured RSSI values and throughput rate.  
Each orientation is expected to be significantly different, thereby indicating one as the 
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most appropriate.  The next chapter discusses the experiments performed, the data 
gathered, and the data analysis.  
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4.  Experiments, Data, and Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses orientation and throughput experiments utilizing consumer 
level Bluetooth Compact Flash (CF) and PC cards as well as models developed to explain 
observations.  First, the orientation experiment is discussed along with the data collected 
and data analysis.  Second, the anomalies observed are presented followed by discussion 
of the interference model developed.  Finally, the throughput experiment is discussed in 
detail to include a mapping of the ranges of throughput observed. 
4.2 RSSI 
Utilizing a pair of Armadillo Bluetooth CF Cards (Ericsson chipsets), the first 
experiment seeks to determine the effect of receiver orientation on the RSSI in a free-
space environment.  The transmitter orientation is kept constant while the receiver is 
placed in four different orientations at each distance.  Distances are measured in one-
meter increments in a straight line from the transmitter.  The transmitter and receiver are 
supported by cardboard boxes at a height of 0.59055 m.  A Linux script file (c.f., 
Appendix A) is used to sample the RSSI 100 times at each orientation and distance.  
Table 7 records the average values.  
The Armadillo Bluetooth CF cards used in the experiment have an integrated 
microstrip patch antenna for transmissions.  It is expected that the antenna orientation  
contributes to the RSSI value.  The extent to which the orientation contributes to the 
variation in RSSI values is determined through computation of effects and Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) as described in [8].   
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Table 7.  RSSI Values (dB) for Experiment 1 
  Orientation (degrees) 
    90 180 270 360 
1 0.00 -2.66 0.00 -3.34
2 0.00 -5.00 0.00 -8.04
3 -5.43 -8.50 -5.81 -12.74
4 -4.26 -9.77 -4.70 -12.84
5 -6.98 -13.36 -11.38 -13.56
6 -12.87 -13.12 -12.96 -13.80
7 -13.22 -11.90 -12.52 -15.00
8 -10.13 -13.00 -10.15 -13.92
9 -10.30 -12.80 -10.70 -15.00
10 -9.76 -12.56 -10.06 -15.00
11 -10.79 -13.24 -10.85 -15.00
12 -10.65 -15.00 -10.00 -15.00
13 -11.06 -14.08 -11.13 -15.00
14 -12.04 -14.88 -11.36 -15.00
15 -12.16 -14.80 -12.10 -15.00
16 -13.16 -14.68 -13.12 -15.00
17 -14.46 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00
18 -13.44 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00
19 -13.38 -15.00 -14.78 -15.00
20 -15.00 -15.00 -14.94 -15.00
D
istance (m
eters) 
21 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00
 
4.2.1 Antenna Orientation 
The orientation is measured with respect to the transmitter/receiver.  The 
Bluetooth card is inserted on the right-hand side of the laptop when facing the screen.  
Figure 10 depicts the orientations of the patch antenna on the Bluetooth card when it is 
inserted in the laptop. 
 
Figure 10.  Microstrip Patch Antenna Orientation 
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4.2.2 Computation of Effects 
The computation of effects shown in Table 8 is interpreted as follows.  The mean 
distance with a mean orientation has an RSSI value of –11.72 dB.  The RSSI value for 
the 90-degree orientation is 1.52 dB higher than that of an average orientation.  The 270-
degree orientation RSSI value is 1.36 dB higher on average than that of an average 
orientation.  The RSSI value for the 180-degree orientation is 0.86 dB lower than that of 
an average orientation and the 360-degree orientation is 2.01 dB lower than that of an 
average orientation.  The RSSI value for the 90-degree orientation is on average higher 
than any of the other measured orientations.   
Table 8.  Computation of Effects for Orientation Experiment 1 
  Orientation (degrees)    
    90 180 270 360 Row Sum Row Mean Row Effect
1 0.00 -2.66 0.00 -3.34 -6.00 -1.50 10.22
2 0.00 -5.00 0.00 -8.04 -13.04 -3.26 8.46
3 -5.43 -8.50 -5.81 -12.74 -32.48 -8.12 3.60
4 -4.26 -9.77 -4.70 -12.84 -31.57 -7.89 3.82
5 -6.98 -13.36 -11.38 -13.56 -45.28 -11.32 0.40
6 -12.87 -13.12 -12.96 -13.8 -52.75 -13.19 -1.47
7 -13.22 -11.90 -12.52 -15.00 -52.64 -13.16 -1.44
8 -10.13 -13.00 -10.15 -13.92 -47.20 -11.80 -0.08
9 -10.30 -12.80 -10.70 -15.00 -48.80 -12.20 -0.48
10 -9.76 -12.56 -10.06 -15.00 -47.38 -11.85 -0.13
11 -10.79 -13.24 -10.85 -15.00 -49.88 -12.47 -0.75
12 -10.65 -15.00 -10.00 -15.00 -50.65 -12.66 -0.95
13 -11.06 -14.08 -11.13 -15.00 -51.27 -12.82 -1.10
14 -12.04 -14.88 -11.36 -15.00 -53.28 -13.32 -1.60
15 -12.16 -14.80 -12.10 -15.00 -54.06 -13.52 -1.80
16 -13.16 -14.68 -13.12 -15.00 -55.96 -13.99 -2.27
17 -14.46 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00 -57.46 -14.37 -2.65
18 -13.44 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00 -56.44 -14.11 -2.39
19 -13.38 -15.00 -14.78 -15.00 -58.16 -14.54 -2.82
20 -15.00 -15.00 -14.94 -15.00 -59.94 -14.99 -3.27
D
istance (m
eters) 
21 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -60.00 -15.00 -3.28
 Column Sum -214.09 -264.35 -217.56 -288.24 -984.24   
 Column Mean -10.19 -12.59 -10.36 -13.73  -11.72  
 Column Effect 1.52 -0.87 1.36 -2.01    
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The 90% confidence intervals for effects in Table 9 shows that each orientation is 
significantly different from each other except for one case.  The 90% confidence interval 
for the contrasts between the 90-degree orientation and the 270-degree orientation is (-
2.26, 2.59).  Since this confidence interval contains zero, the 90-degree orientation and 
the 270-degree orientation are not significantly different from each other.  Hence, either 
orientation can be used for the throughput experiment. 
Table 9.  90% Confidence Intervals for Orientation Effects 
Parameter Mean Effect Std Dev Conf Interval 
Mean -984.24 0.03 -984.30 -984.18
Orientation   
90 1.52 0.06 1.42 1.62
180 -0.87 0.06 -0.97 -0.77
270 1.36 0.06 1.26 1.46
360 -2.01 0.06 -2.11 -1.91
 
4.2.3 Analysis of Variance 
The ANOVA for Experiment 1 in Table 10 shows that distance accounts for the 
majority of variation (77.72%) in the RSSI values.  This is expected simply due to path 
loss.  The receiver antenna orientation accounts for 13.92% of the variation in RSSI 
value, while only 0.43% is accounted for by errors.  The remaining 7.94% of variation is 
due to interaction between the factors (distance and orientation) in the experiment. 
The F-ratio is used to test the significance of each factor.  Utilizing the degrees of 
freedom (DOF) for orientation and distance, each factor’s respective F-value is computed 
and compared to those contained in the table of quantiles of F-variates [8].  Each factor is 
significant at level α = 0.01 (99-percentile) since the computed F-value is greater than the 
F-value from the table of quantiles.  
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Thus, the significance of receiver antenna orientation, as indicated by the F-ratio 
test, combined with the computation of effects, identifies the 90-degree and 270-degree 
receiver antenna orientations as the better receiver antenna orientations for future best-
case scenario experiments. 
Table 10.  ANOVA for Orientation Experiment 1 
Component 
Sum of 
Squares Variation (%) DOF 
Mean 
Square 
F-
Computed F-Table 
y 12883.44  84    
y.. 11532.48  1    
y-y.. 1350.96 100.00 83    
Orientation 188.00 13.92 3 62.67 643.62 4.31 
Distance 1049.91 77.72 20 52.50 539.16 2.37 
Errors 5.84 0.43 60 0.10     
 
4.3 Signal Interference 
When viewed graphically, it is clear that received signal strength does not 
decrease in a smooth manner as expected from theoretical path loss.  Theoretical path 
loss shown in Figure 11 is calculated from the following equation: 
Path Loss = 





R
Log
π
λ
4
20 10  (4) 
 
where λ is the signal wavelength and R is the signal propagation distance.  Instead, signal 
strength attenuates markedly at approximately 3m and 6m as shown in Figure 12, 
especially for the 90-degree and 270-degree antenna orientations.  
To determine whether this anomaly is due to experimental error even though not 
indicated by ANOVA, three additional experiments were performed.  The second 
experiment consisted of a 3Com Bluetooth PC Card running on a Dell Inspiron 8200 
under Windows 2000 as the transmitter and the same receiver configuration used in 
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Experiment 1.  All other factors in the experiment were the same.  Experiment 2, shown 
in Figure 13, shows the same attenuation in RSSI values at the same distances. 
 
Figure 11.  Theoretical Free-Space Path Loss 
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Figure 12.  RSSI Values for Experiment 1 
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Figure 13.  RSSI Values for Experiment 2 
 
The third experiment consisted of a TDK Bluetooth PC Card running on a Dell 
Inspiron 8200 under Windows 2000 as the transmitter and the same receiver 
configuration from Experiment 1.  All other factors in the experiment were the same.  
Experiment 3 results, shown in Figure 14, again reveal the same drop in RSSI values at 
the same distances.   
To verify the results of the first three experiments, a fourth experiment was 
performed in which the transmitter orientation was varied and the receiver orientation 
held constant at 270-degrees.  This orientation was previously found to have a strong 
received signal strength.  
Results from Experiment 4, shown in Figure 15, indicate that the anomaly occurs 
regardless of orientation of transmitter or receiver.  Although the RSSI is only an 
approximation, and can vary up to 5 dB within a range that is partially dependent on the 
chipset maker, the continual occurrence of the received signal strength drop off indicates 
RX 
Orientation 
(Degrees) 
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this is not likely a hardware issue, but caused by some fundamental property of Bluetooth 
transmissions. 
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Figure 14.  RSSI Values for Experiment 3 
 
After further investigation, the cause for signal attenuation was determined to be 
destructive interference of a reflected signal superpositioned on the primary signal at the 
point of reception.  This was verified through the construction of an analytical model 
identifying distances at which maximum destructive interference occurs.  
For destructive interference to occur, a signal reflected from a planar surface 
within the region of the experiment is superpositioned with the primary signal.  The 
reflected signal arrives 180 degrees out-of-phase with the primary signal and 
destructively interferes at all even numbered half-wavelength increments.  The 
experiments are performed in an free-space environment where the only plane of 
reflection is the ground.  Thus, the distance traveled by the reflected wave equals the 
distance traveled by the primary signal plus any even numbered half-wavelength. 
RX 
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Figure 15.  RSSI Values for Experiment 4 
 
The geometry of Figure 16 is used for destructive signal analysis.  Let the primary 
signal distance be the direct path distance, RD, from the transmitting antenna, AT, to the 
receiving antenna, AR.  The reflected signal distance is R1 + R2 where R1 is the direct 
distance from the transmitting antenna, AT, to the reflection point and R2 is the direct 
distance from the reflection point to the receiving antenna, AR.  Then,  





+=+
221
λmRRR D  (5) 
 
and destructive interference is at its maximum when m is a positive integer. 
Let the transmitting antenna height be h1 and the receiving antenna height be h2.  
Let Θ1 be the angle of incidence and Θ2 be the angle of reflection.  For planar reflection, 
Θ1 = Θ2, since the angle of reflection equals the angle of incidence for any 
electromagnetic wave.  Let the ground distance from the transmitter to the reflection 
TX 
Orientation 
(Degrees) 
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point be l1 and the ground distance from the reflection point to the receiver be l2.  The 
total distance between the antenna bases, RB, is then given by 
21 llRB +=  (6) 
 
 
Figure 16.  Signal Propagation Model 
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Solving for l1 gives  
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and solving for l2 gives 
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Solving for R1, R2 and RD gives 
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and 
( )2122 hhRR BD −+=  (18) 
 
Incorporating R1, R2, and RD into interference equation (5) results in 
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For the RSSI experiments 21 hh = .  Consequently, BD RR =  and 21 RR = , and (19) 
reduces to 
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Solving for RD gives 
λ
λ
m
mh
RD
4
4
22
2 −
=  (21) 
 
Table 11 shows the distance at which the superpositioned signals result in 
maximum destructive interference for h = 0.59055 m and wavelength λ at the lower 
(2.402 GHz), middle (2.441 GHz), and upper end (2.480 GHz) of the Bluetooth 
frequency band.  It is clear that destructive interference occurs when the transmitter and 
receiver are separated by 3 m or 6 m, each of which correspond to even numbered 
wavelength intervals.  The proximity of the experimental transmitter and receiver 
separations to these distances is sufficient to explain the drop in RSSI values.  The exact 
power drop is not calculated since the goal of this analytical model was to only explain a 
probable cause. 
4.4  Throughput Ranges 
The final experiment incorporated the previously determined better receiver 
orientations to identify some best-case ranges for throughput of Bluetooth transmission.  
Best-case refers to the best value measured during each experiment rather than the best 
possible.  The hardware consisted of an Anycom Bluetooth CF Card as the transmitter 
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and an Armadillo Bluetooth CF Card as the receiver, both operating on Dell Inspiron 
8200s under Windows 2000.  Both Bluetooth cards use the same Ericsson chipset and 
microstrip patch antenna (c.f., Figure 17). 
Table 11.  Destructive Interference Distances 
  Frequency Range  
    Low Mid High   
1 12.63 12.84 13.05
2 6.27 6.37 6.48
3 4.12 4.20 4.27
4 3.04 3.10 3.15
5 2.37 2.42 2.46
6 1.92 1.96 2.00
7 1.59 1.62 1.66
8 1.33 1.36 1.39
9 1.12 1.15 1.18
10 0.95 0.98 1.01
11 0.80 0.83 0.86
12 0.68 0.70 0.73
13 0.56 0.59 0.61
14 0.46 0.49 0.51
15 0.37 0.40 0.42
16 0.29 0.31 0.33
17 0.21 0.24 0.26
18 0.14 0.16 0.18
19 0.07 0.09 0.11
20 0.01 0.03 0.05
21 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01
H
alf W
avelengths 
22 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07
D
istance (m
eters) 
 
A Merlin Bluetooth packet analyzer is used to determine the exact time between 
the first and last DM5 packets.  Specific settings for the Merlin are documented in 
Appendix B.  The Merlin actively synchronizes to the master and slave in the piconet and 
sniffs all traffic on the piconet.  Each packet is time stamped at the time of reception.  
Once the Merlin is synchronized to the piconet it becomes passive and does not transmit.  
Thus, if a packet is received with errors, the Merlin does not request retransmission.  To 
determine if retransmissions occur due to errors received by the slave, all captured 
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packets must be carefully analyzed and correlated.  This particular task is extremely 
difficult due to the packet transmission timing and the system storage capabilities.  
Therefore, throughput calculations by the Merlin do not reflect the true piconet payload 
throughput.  Only the timestamp of when the packet is received is trustworthy.  The 
difference between the first and last DM5 packet timestamps provides the total 
transmission time of the FTP transaction. 
 
Figure 17.  Microstrip Patch Antenna Dimensions 
 
The transmitter and receiver are both placed on wooden stools at a height of 
0.631825 m.  Wooden stools are used to minimize the possibility of interference caused 
by metal.  The receiver orientation is a constant 270-degrees based on the orientation 
findings of the RSSI experiments and on the likelihood of how a typical receiver is 
positioned when using a laptop (i.e., person at the keyboard facing the transmitter).  The 
transmitter orientation is varied in 90-degree increments to emulate moving the receiver 
in a circular pattern around the transmitter at 90-degree increments.  Table 12 displays 
the best-case throughput values measured.  Throughput was sampled at 5 m increments 
and then refined to 1 m increments to determine each of the following throughput level’s 
(300, 200, and 100 kbps) range.  A blank entry in the table indicates no values were 
measured at that distance and orientation.  A “fail” entry indicates a distance and 
orientation at which a connection could not be established or maintained long enough to 
transfer the file.  
.0206375m 
.0047625m
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Table 12.  FTP Throughput Values (kbps) 
  Antenna Orientation (degrees) 
  90 180 270 360 
1 302.05 307.18 305.17 302.71 
2 79.44    
3 184.79    
4 259.00    
5 235.57 299.42 304.32 304.49 
6 158.15    
7 Fail    
8 Fail    
9 Fail    
10 Fail 221.68 300.75 302.49 
11     
12     
13     
14     
15  219.06 300.19 303.32 
16  173.38 224.30  
17  211.81   
18  79.12   
19  177.54   
20  135.44 258.52 302.78 
21  106.83 225.24  
22  Fail 187.68  
23  Fail 138.87  
24   140.75  
25   Fail 285.25 
26   Fail 288.01 
27    270.56 
28    212.42 
29    189.86 
30    201.75 
31    132.97 
32    102.75 
33    80.10 
34    18.55 
D
istance (m
eters) 
35    20.44 
 
Although it is expected that the best orientation occurs when the transmitter and 
receiver antennas are set at the 90-degree or 270-degree orientation, based on the 
outcome of the RSSI tests, the best results are clearly obtained from the 360-degree 
orientation.  Even though this appears contradictory to findings from the antenna 
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orientation experiments, it is easily explained by considering the asymmetric antenna 
gain characteristics.  Figure 18 shows a comparison between total antenna gain factors, 
Gij, for the orientation and throughput experiments.  The 270-degree receiver orientation 
in the orientation experiment has a total gain factor of G12, where i = 1 is the transmitter 
gain and j = 2 is the receiver gain.  The 360-degree transmitter orientation gain in the 
throughput experiment is G21, where i = 2 is the receiver gain and j = 1 is the transmitter 
gain.  This shows that the total gain factor in the best-case orientation experiment is the 
same gain factor producing best results in the throughput experiment (G12 = G21). 
 
Figure 18.  Total Antenna Gain Factor (Gij) Comparison 
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Figure 19 shows a mapping of the ranges at which throughput levels of 300 kbps, 
200 kbps, and 100 kbps or better were obtained.  Although this is a best-case sample, the 
mapping reflects a more realistic measure of the functional ranges of Bluetooth devices.  
The devices are required to operate with a raw bit error rate (BER) of 10-3 when receiving 
a signal of –70 dBm or better.  Additionally, the 20 dB width of the Golden Receive 
Range crudely equates to a physical factor of ten.  Thus, when a signal is received within 
10 m, it should be in the Golden Range and the throughput at its maximum.  Outside 10 
m, the signal strength decreases as the distance increases.  The throughput level is 
maintained until minimum signal strength of –70 dBm is reached.  The 10 m functional 
range of Bluetooth, as defined in the specification, is a minimum standard for 
manufacturer compliance.  It is clear that the functional range for the devices tested is 
well beyond the 10 m minimum and that a throughput level equivalent to best sampled is 
achievable at over twice the 10 m minimum. 
As shown in Table 12, a throughput level of approximately 300 kbps is achievable 
at a distance of 20 m.  This level of throughput is equivalent to that achieved within the 
10 m functional range.  Comparing this distance to the RSSI values sampled shows that 
the RSSI values for any given orientation at this range had reached the lower bound 
established by the manufacturer.  Thus, it is not possible to correlate the RSSI values and 
throughput. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter discussed the orientation and throughput experiments performed, the 
data collected, and analysis.  Additionally, a signal interference model was developed to 
explain anomalies in the sampled RSSI values.  The orientation experiment showed that 
 
64 
 
certain orientations of the Bluetooth device antenna received stronger signals than others 
and that the orientation of the antenna is a statistically significant factor. 
The signal interference model showed the ranges at which destructive interference 
of the Bluetooth transmissions occur.  This accounted for the dips in the RSSI values.  
The throughput experiment developed a 360-degree mapping of throughput ranges for a 
single configuration of the transmitter antenna.  The next chapter discusses this study as a 
whole and the conclusions drawn from it. 
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Figure 19.  Throughput Ranges (meters) 
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5.  Conclusions 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews and summarizes the research and the research objectives.  
First, the impact of the research is discussed and its implications for using Bluetooth 
devices within the DoD.  Next, objectives and their respective experiments are reviewed 
along with conclusions drawn.  Last, potential follow on areas of study are outlined. 
5.2 Research Impact 
The security risks associated with the interception of Bluetooth communications 
drove the research objectives.  The first objective, identification of the best antenna 
orientation for a common use configuration is incorporated into the experiment to support 
the second objective.  The second objective, determining throughput ranges, is used to 
identify the zones of vulnerability for interception.  Together, the objectives of this study 
define an approximate distance needed to intercept Bluetooth transmissions. 
5.2.1 Orientation 
The orientation of the micro-strip patch antenna of a Bluetooth device is a 
significant factor in achieving a certain throughput threshold.  In the experiments 
conducted, antenna orientation accounted for approximately 14% of the variance in 
recorded RSSI values.  This means that antenna orientation must be taken into account 
when determining the throughput ranges of a Bluetooth device.  Thus, throughput 
experiments must include antenna orientation as a factor rather than measuring 
throughput at distances varied along a single linear path.  Additionally, this indicates that 
different levels of throughput can be expected for different orientations. 
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Transmitter/receiver distance contributed nearly 78% to the variance in RSSI 
values.  This validated the expectation that path loss is a primary cause for drop in signal 
strength.  An interesting anomaly was identified during the course of the orientation 
experiments.  Destructive interference caused by reflected signal induced fluctuations in 
signal strength as the distance between the transmitter and receiver varied.  This implies 
that signal strength cannot be expected to monotonically decrease due to path loss, but 
will fluctuate.  This fluctuation could impact throughput levels as well, but this was not 
validated in this thesis. 
5.2.2 Ranges of Throughput 
Different throughput levels were measured for each orientation and distance on a 
best-case basis.  Throughput levels fluctuated slightly as predicted, but dropped off 
consistently once a certain distance was reached.  The distance of a given throughput 
level varied from orientation to orientation as expected.  The best throughput levels were 
achieved using a transmitter orientation of 360-degrees.  This appeared to contradict the 
expected best orientation of 90-degrees or 270-degrees.  This deviation is explained by 
comparing the antenna gain patterns of the two experiments and showing that the gain 
patterns of the 270-degree orientation in the orientation experiment was the same gain 
pattern as the 360-degree orientation in the throughput experiment. 
The throughput levels were categorized based on the last distance at which a 
given level or better was achieved.  From this, a 360-degree mapping was produced to 
graphically reflect the potential zones of vulnerability.  Although only four orientations 
were used to generate the map, the arcs between the 90-degree orientation increments 
show the expected throughput ranges when transitioning between one orientation and the 
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next.  This mapping reflects the best-case throughput levels achieved and shows that the 
primary zone of vulnerability is between the 270-degree and 360-degree transmitter 
orientations. 
The throughput level achieved for the 360-degree transmitter orientation was 
equivalent to that achieved when the signal strength was within the Golden Receive 
Range at twice the 10 m minimum distance defined by the core specification.  Comparing 
this distance to the distances at which the RSSI values were measured, it was seen that 
the RSSI values reach their lower bound at approximately the same distance.  Thus, no 
correlation can be drawn between the RSSI value and the level of throughput for the 
configuration used since no change in throughput is observed within the range that the 
RSSI can be measured. 
5.3 Outlines of Future Work 
This thesis provides a preliminary look at the orientation of a Bluetooth device 
antenna and a mapping of throughput ranges for a specific device configuration.  This is 
only an initial look and provides a foundation for areas of further research.  Some future 
areas of research include: 
• Refined measurement of throughput levels for different packet types and 
transmitter orientations 
• Throughput level mapping for different device antennas, both modified and 
unmodified 
• Passive determination of frequency hopping sequence of a piconet 
• Passive synchronization to frequency hopping sequence of a piconet 
• Correlation of signal interference model to throughput level fluctuation 
• Passive identification of devices in a piconet 
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5.4 Summary 
This research determined the effects of antenna orientation on signal strength for 
Bluetooth devices as well as developed a mapping of ranges of different throughput 
levels for a specific Bluetooth device configuration.  The antenna orientation experiments 
determined the significance of antenna orientation on throughput ranges.  Additionally, a 
basic signal interference model was introduced to explain fluctuations in signal strength.  
The throughput experiment generated a mapping of set levels of throughput for certain 
distances and orientations.  The mapping depicts zones of vulnerability for Bluetooth 
communication interception.  Together, these provide a first look study of Bluetooth 
communications and provide ideas for further future studies. 
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Appendix A.  Receiver Signal Strength Indicator Linux Script  
# RSSI Sampler by Tim Kneeland  
# Last updated Dec 2, 2002 
# This script samples Receiver Signal Strength Indicator values and outputs  
# them to a file.  A connection must be established first with a transmitter  
# using "hcitool cc <BD_ADDR>".  Script execution requires three command line  
# arguments following script name. First argument is the BD_ADDR of the  
# transmitter a connection is established with.  Second argument is the name  
# of the output file to append the data too.  Third argument is the number of  
# RSSI samples to take for each orientation and distance measurement.  Script  
# will prompt for distance in meters (integer values only) and prompt to change  
# orientation of receiver.  Script is exited by input of a distance of 99. 
 
# Output the date to file 
# date >> $2 
# A distance of 99 will exit the script 
distance=0 
while [ $distance -le 99 ] 
do 
  # Prompt for distance 
  echo -n "Input distance between transmitter and receiver in meters: " 
  read distance 
  if [ $distance -eq 99 ] 
  then 
    exit 1 
  fi 
  # Output distance to file 
  echo "Distance in meters: $distance" >> $2 
  # Four different orientations 
  for iteration in 1 2 3 4 
  do 
    # Prompt for proper orientation of receiver  
    echo -n "Place receiver at `expr 90 \* $iteration` degrees and hit enter." 
    read z 
    echo "" >> $2 
    echo "Orientation in degrees: `expr 90 \* $iteration`" >> $2 
    # Sample RSSI the number of times specified by the third argument 
    x=1 
    while [ $x -le $3 ] 
    do 
 hcitool rssi $1 >> $2 
 x=`expr $x + 1` 
    done 
  done 
done 
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Appendix B.  Merlin Bluetooth Packet Analyzer Settings for Throughput Experiments 
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Figure 21.  Merlin Modes Recording Options 
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Figure 22.  Merlin Events Recording Options 
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Figure 23.  Merlin Actions Recording Options 
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Appendix C.  Experiment Data Analysis Tables 
Table 13.  Computation of Effects for Experiment 1 
  Orientation    
  90 180 270 360 Row Sum Row Mean Row Effect 
1 0.00 -2.66 0.00 -3.34 -6.00 -1.50 10.22 
2 0.00 -5.00 0.00 -8.04 -13.04 -3.26 8.46 
3 -5.43 -8.50 -5.81 -12.74 -32.48 -8.12 3.60 
4 -4.26 -9.77 -4.70 -12.84 -31.57 -7.89 3.82 
5 -6.98 -13.36 -11.38 -13.56 -45.28 -11.32 0.40 
6 -12.87 -13.12 -12.96 -13.80 -52.75 -13.19 -1.47 
7 -13.22 -11.90 -12.52 -15.00 -52.64 -13.16 -1.44 
8 -10.13 -13.00 -10.15 -13.92 -47.20 -11.80 -0.08 
9 -10.30 -12.80 -10.70 -15.00 -48.80 -12.20 -0.48 
10 -9.76 -12.56 -10.06 -15.00 -47.38 -11.85 -0.13 
11 -10.79 -13.24 -10.85 -15.00 -49.88 -12.47 -0.75 
12 -10.65 -15.00 -10.00 -15.00 -50.65 -12.66 -0.95 
13 -11.06 -14.08 -11.13 -15.00 -51.27 -12.82 -1.10 
14 -12.04 -14.88 -11.36 -15.00 -53.28 -13.32 -1.60 
15 -12.16 -14.80 -12.10 -15.00 -54.06 -13.52 -1.80 
16 -13.16 -14.68 -13.12 -15.00 -55.96 -13.99 -2.27 
17 -14.46 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00 -57.46 -14.37 -2.65 
18 -13.44 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00 -56.44 -14.11 -2.39 
19 -13.38 -15.00 -14.78 -15.00 -58.16 -14.54 -2.82 
20 -15.00 -15.00 -14.94 -15.00 -59.94 -14.99 -3.27 
D
istance 
21 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -60.00 -15.00 -3.28 
 Column Sum -214.09 -264.35 -217.56 -288.24 -984.24   
 Column Mean -10.19 -12.59 -10.36 -13.73  -11.72  
 Column Effect 1.52 -0.87 1.36 -2.01    
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Table 14.  Error Computation for Experiment 1 
  Orientation 
  90 180 270 360 
1 -0.02 -0.29 0.14 0.17 
2 1.74 -0.87 1.90 -2.77 
3 1.17 0.49 0.95 -2.61 
4 2.11 -1.01 1.84 -2.94 
5 2.82 -1.17 -1.42 -0.23 
6 -1.20 0.94 -1.13 1.40 
7 -1.58 2.13 -0.72 0.17 
8 0.15 -0.33 0.29 -0.11 
9 0.38 0.27 0.14 -0.79 
10 0.56 0.16 0.43 -1.15 
11 0.16 0.10 0.26 -0.52 
12 0.49 -1.47 1.31 -0.33 
13 0.24 -0.39 0.33 -0.17 
14 -0.24 -0.69 0.60 0.33 
15 -0.17 -0.41 0.06 0.52 
16 -0.69 0.18 -0.49 1.00 
17 -1.62 0.24 0.01 1.37 
18 -0.85 -0.02 -0.25 1.12 
19 -0.36 0.41 -1.60 1.55 
20 -1.54 0.86 -1.31 1.99 
D
istance 
21 -1.52 0.87 -1.36 2.01 
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Table 15.  Error Squares for Experiment 1 
  Orientation  
  90 180 270 360  
1 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.13 
2 3.02 0.76 3.62 7.68 15.08 
3 1.36 0.24 0.91 6.82 9.33 
4 4.45 1.01 3.37 8.64 17.47 
5 7.94 1.37 2.01 0.05 11.37 
6 1.45 0.88 1.28 1.95 5.56 
7 2.50 4.54 0.51 0.03 7.59 
8 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.23 
9 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.63 0.86 
10 0.32 0.02 0.18 1.31 1.84 
11 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.27 0.38 
12 0.24 2.15 1.70 0.11 4.20 
13 0.06 0.15 0.11 0.03 0.35 
14 0.06 0.47 0.36 0.11 1.00 
15 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.27 0.48 
16 0.48 0.03 0.24 1.00 1.75 
17 2.62 0.06 0.00 1.89 4.56 
18 0.73 0.00 0.06 1.25 2.04 
19 0.13 0.17 2.55 2.40 5.25 
20 2.36 0.73 1.72 3.97 8.79 
D
istance 
21 2.32 0.76 1.84 4.03 8.95 
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Table 16.  Sample Squares for Experiment 1 
  Orientation  
  90 180 270 360 Row Sum
1 0.00 7.07 0.00 11.15 18.23 
2 0.00 25.00 0.00 64.64 89.64 
3 29.48 72.25 33.75 162.30 297.79 
4 18.14 95.45 22.09 164.86 300.55 
5 48.72 178.48 129.50 183.87 540.58 
6 165.63 172.13 167.96 190.44 696.17 
7 174.76 141.61 156.75 225.00 698.12 
8 102.61 169.00 103.02 193.76 568.40 
9 106.09 163.84 114.49 225.00 609.42 
10 95.25 157.75 101.20 225.00 579.21 
11 116.42 175.29 117.72 225.00 634.44 
12 113.42 225.00 100.00 225.00 663.42 
13 122.32 198.24 123.87 225.00 669.44 
14 144.96 221.41 129.04 225.00 720.42 
15 147.86 219.04 146.41 225.00 738.31 
16 173.18 215.50 172.13 225.00 785.82 
17 209.09 225.00 169.00 225.00 828.09 
18 180.63 225.00 169.00 225.00 799.63 
19 179.02 225.00 218.44 225.00 847.47 
20 225.00 225.00 223.20 225.00 898.20 
D
istance 
21 225.00 225.00 225 225.00 900 
 Column Sum 2577.65 3562.10 2622.62 4121.05  
     SSY = 12883.44
     SS0 = 11532.48
     SSA = 188.00 
     SSB = 1049.91 
     SSAB = 107.20 
     SST = 1350.96 
     SSE = 5.84 
       
     Explained by Orientation = 13.92% 
     Explained by Distance = 77.72% 
     
Explained by Interactions 
= 7.94% 
     Unexplained = 0.43% 
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Table 17.  ANOVA for Experiment 1 
Component Sum of Squares 
Percentage 
of Variation
Degrees 
of 
Freedom
Mean 
Square
F-
Computed 
F-
Table 
99% 
y 12883.44  84    
y.. 11532.48  1    
y-y.. 1350.96 100.00% 83    
Orientation 188.00 13.92% 3 62.67 643.62 4.31 
Distance 1049.91 77.72% 20 52.50 539.16 2.37 
Errors 5.84 0.43% 60 0.10   
       
 Std Dev Errors = 0.31     
 Std Dev Mean = 0.03     
 Std Dev Orientation = 0.06     
 Std Dev Distance = 0.15     
 
Table 18.  90% Confidence Intervals for Effects for Experiment 1 
Parameter Mean Effect Std Dev Conf Interval 
Mean -984.24 0.03 -984.30 -984.18 
Orientation     
90 1.52 0.06 1.42 1.62 
180 -0.87 0.06 -0.97 -0.77 
270 1.36 0.06 1.26 1.46 
360 -2.01 0.06 -2.11 -1.91 
Distance     
1 10.22 0.15 9.96 10.47 
2 8.46 0.15 8.20 8.71 
3 3.60 0.15 3.34 3.85 
4 3.82 0.15 3.57 4.08 
5 0.40 0.15 0.14 0.65 
6 -1.47 0.15 -1.72 -1.22 
7 -1.44 0.15 -1.70 -1.19 
8 -0.08 0.15 -0.34 0.17 
9 -0.48 0.15 -0.74 -0.23 
10 -0.13 0.15 -0.38 0.13 
11 -0.75 0.15 -1.01 -0.50 
12 -0.95 0.15 -1.20 -0.69 
13 -1.10 0.15 -1.35 -0.85 
14 -1.60 0.15 -1.86 -1.35 
15 -1.80 0.15 -2.05 -1.54 
16 -2.27 0.15 -2.53 -2.02 
17 -2.65 0.15 -2.90 -2.39 
18 -2.39 0.15 -2.65 -2.14 
19 -2.82 0.15 -3.08 -2.57 
20 -3.27 0.15 -3.52 -3.01 
21 -3.28 0.15 -3.54 -3.03 
* Not Significant    
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Table 19.  Computation of Effects for Experiment 2 
  Orientation    
  90 180 270 360 Row Sum Row Mean Row Effect 
1 0.00 -2.66 0.00 -3.34 -6.00 -1.50 10.21 
2 0.00 -5.00 0.00 -8.04 -13.04 -3.26 8.45 
3 -4.72 -8.25 -5.02 -11.01 -29.01 -7.25 4.46 
4 -4.93 -11.93 -3.08 -11.97 -31.92 -7.98 3.73 
5 -11.69 -15.00 -10.64 -13.01 -50.35 -12.59 -0.88 
6 -14.02 -13.00 -12.99 -14.98 -54.99 -13.75 -2.04 
7 -12.26 -12.81 -10.03 -15.00 -50.11 -12.53 -0.82 
8 -9.96 -12.97 -9.94 -15.00 -47.88 -11.97 -0.26 
9 -10.00 -12.96 -10.00 -15.00 -47.96 -11.99 -0.28 
10 -9.76 -13.00 -8.43 -15.00 -46.19 -11.55 0.16 
11 -9.83 -13.24 -10.85 -15.00 -48.92 -12.23 -0.52 
12 -10.65 -15.00 -10.00 -15.00 -50.65 -12.66 -0.95 
13 -11.06 -14.08 -11.13 -15.00 -51.27 -12.82 -1.11 
14 -12.04 -14.88 -11.36 -15.00 -53.28 -13.32 -1.61 
15 -12.16 -14.80 -12.10 -15.00 -54.06 -13.52 -1.81 
16 -13.16 -14.68 -13.12 -15.00 -55.96 -13.99 -2.28 
17 -14.46 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00 -57.46 -14.37 -2.66 
18 -13.44 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00 -56.44 -14.11 -2.40 
19 -13.38 -15.00 -14.78 -15.00 -58.16 -14.54 -2.83 
20 -15.00 -15.00 -14.94 -15.00 -59.94 -14.99 -3.28 
D
istance 
21 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -60.00 -15.00 -3.29 
 Column Sum -217.55 -269.27 -209.44 -287.35 -983.61   
 Column Mean -10.36 -12.82 -9.97 -13.68  -11.71  
 Column Effect 1.35 -1.11 1.74 -1.97    
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Table 20.  Error Computation for Experiment 2 
  Orientation 
  90 180 270 360 
1 0.15 -0.05 -0.24 0.13 
2 1.91 -0.63 1.52 -2.81 
3 1.18 0.11 0.49 -1.78 
4 1.69 -2.84 3.16 -2.01 
5 -0.46 -1.30 0.21 1.55 
6 -1.62 1.86 -0.98 0.74 
7 -1.09 0.83 0.76 -0.50 
8 0.66 0.11 0.29 -1.06 
9 0.64 0.14 0.26 -1.04 
10 0.44 -0.34 1.38 -1.48 
11 1.04 0.10 -0.35 -0.79 
12 0.66 -1.22 0.93 -0.36 
13 0.41 -0.15 -0.05 -0.21 
14 -0.07 -0.45 0.22 0.29 
15 0.01 -0.17 -0.32 0.49 
16 -0.52 0.42 -0.87 0.96 
17 -1.44 0.48 -0.37 1.34 
18 -0.68 0.22 -0.63 1.08 
19 -0.19 0.65 -1.98 1.51 
20 -1.36 1.10 -1.69 1.96 
D
istance 
21 -1.35 1.11 -1.74 1.97 
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Table 21.  Error Squares for Experiment 2 
  Orientation  
  90 180 270 360  
1 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.10 
2 3.65 0.39 2.32 7.88 14.24 
3 1.40 0.01 0.24 3.18 4.83 
4 2.87 8.07 9.98 4.05 24.98 
5 0.21 1.69 0.04 2.40 4.34 
6 2.64 3.46 0.96 0.55 7.61 
7 1.19 0.69 0.58 0.25 2.70 
8 0.44 0.01 0.08 1.12 1.65 
9 0.41 0.02 0.07 1.07 1.56 
10 0.19 0.11 1.90 2.18 4.39 
11 1.09 0.01 0.13 0.63 1.86 
12 0.44 1.50 0.86 0.13 2.93 
13 0.17 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.23 
14 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.09 0.34 
15 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.24 0.37 
16 0.27 0.18 0.75 0.93 2.13 
17 2.09 0.23 0.14 1.79 4.25 
18 0.46 0.05 0.39 1.17 2.08 
19 0.04 0.43 3.91 2.29 6.66 
20 1.86 1.21 2.86 3.84 9.76 
D
istance 
21 1.82 1.24 3.01 3.89 9.97 
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Table 22.  Sample Squares for Experiment 2 
  Orientation  
  90 180 270 360 Row Sum
1 0.00 7.08 0.00 11.16 18.23 
2 0.00 25.00 0.00 64.64 89.64 
3 22.28 68.11 25.28 121.20 236.87 
4 24.36 142.42 9.51 143.19 319.48 
5 136.80 225.00 113.25 169.31 644.36 
6 196.62 169.00 168.79 224.40 758.81 
7 150.50 164.10 100.64 225.00 640.24 
8 99.20 168.32 98.92 225.00 591.45 
9 100.08 168.01 100.00 225.00 593.09 
10 95.26 169.00 71.17 225.00 560.42 
11 96.79 175.30 117.72 225.00 614.81 
12 113.42 225.00 100.00 225.00 663.42 
13 122.32 198.25 123.88 225.00 669.45 
14 144.96 221.41 129.05 225.00 720.43 
15 147.87 219.04 146.41 225.00 738.32 
16 173.19 215.50 172.13 225.00 785.82 
17 209.09 225.00 169.00 225.00 828.09 
18 180.63 225.00 169.00 225.00 799.63 
19 179.02 225.00 218.45 225.00 847.47 
20 225.00 225.00 223.20 225.00 898.20 
D
istance 
21 225.00 225.00 225.00 225.00 900.00 
 Column Sum2642.39 3685.542481.41 4108.89  
     SSY = 12918.24 
     SS0 = 11517.82 
     SSA = 209.38 
     SSB = 1079.35 
     SSAB = 106.97 
     SST = 1400.43 
     SSE = 4.72 
       
     Explained by Orientation = 14.95% 
     Explained by Distance = 77.07% 
     Explained by Interactions = 7.64% 
     Unexplained = 0.34% 
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Table 23.  ANOVA for Experiment 2 
Component Sum of Squares 
Percentage 
of Variation
Degrees 
of 
Freedom
Mean 
Square
F-
Computed 
F-
Table 
y 12918.24  84    
y.. 11517.82  1    
y-y.. 1400.43 100.00% 83    
Orientation 209.38 14.95% 3 69.79 886.71 4.31 
Distance 1079.35 77.07% 20 53.97 685.65 2.37 
Errors 4.72 0.34% 60 0.08   
       
 Std Dev Errors = 0.28     
 Std Dev Mean = 0.03     
 Std Dev Orientation = 0.05     
 Std Dev Distance = 0.14     
 
Table 24.  90% Confidence Intervals for Effects for Experiment 2 
Parameter Mean Effect Std Dev Conf Interval 
Mean -11.71 0.03 -11.76 -11.66 
Orientation     
90 1.35 0.05 1.26 1.44 
180 -1.11 0.05 -1.20 -1.02 
270 1.74 0.05 1.65 1.82 
360 -1.97 0.05 -2.06 -1.88 
Distance     
1 10.21 0.14 9.98 10.44 
2 8.45 0.14 8.22 8.68 
3 4.46 0.14 4.23 4.69 
4 3.73 0.14 3.50 3.96 
5 -0.88 0.14 -1.11 -0.65 
6 -2.04 0.14 -2.27 -1.81 
7 -0.82 0.14 -1.05 -0.59 
8 -0.26 0.14 -0.49 -0.03 
9 -0.28 0.14 -0.51 -0.05 
10 0.16 0.14 -0.07 0.39 
11 -0.52 0.14 -0.75 -0.29 
12 -0.95 0.14 -1.18 -0.72 
13 -1.11 0.14 -1.34 -0.88 
14 -1.61 0.14 -1.84 -1.38 
15 -1.81 0.14 -2.03 -1.58 
16 -2.28 0.14 -2.51 -2.05 
17 -2.66 0.14 -2.88 -2.43 
18 -2.40 0.14 -2.63 -2.17 
19 -2.83 0.14 -3.06 -2.60 
20 -3.28 0.14 -3.50 -3.05 
21 -3.29 0.14 -3.52 -3.06 
* Not Significant    
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Table 25.  Computation of Effects for Experiment 3 
  Orientation    
  90 180 270 360 Row Sum Row Mean Row Effect 
1 -0.14 -11.82 -1.31 -5.14 -18.41 -4.60 8.23 
2 -1.56 -12.16 -2.48 -8.40 -24.60 -6.15 6.69 
3 -5.21 -15.00 -8.94 -10.79 -39.94 -9.99 2.85 
4 -5.65 -15.00 -8.28 -11.28 -40.21 -10.05 2.78 
5 -11.10 -15.00 -14.34 -14.50 -54.94 -13.74 -0.90 
6 -13.70 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -58.70 -14.68 -1.84 
7 -11.98 -15.00 -13.42 -15.00 -55.40 -13.85 -1.01 
8 -10.41 -15.00 -13.00 -14.96 -53.37 -13.34 -0.51 
9 -9.83 -15.00 -13.00 -14.66 -52.49 -13.12 -0.29 
10 -10.38 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00 -53.38 -13.35 -0.51 
11 -11.06 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00 -54.06 -13.52 -0.68 
12 -10.97 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00 -53.97 -13.49 -0.66 
13 -12.14 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00 -55.14 -13.79 -0.95 
14 -11.58 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00 -54.58 -13.65 -0.81 
15 -12.58 -15.00 -14.00 -15.00 -56.58 -14.15 -1.31 
16 -12.98 -15.00 -14.94 -15.00 -57.92 -14.48 -1.64 
17 -13.00 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -58.00 -14.50 -1.66 
18 -13.14 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -58.14 -14.54 -1.70 
19 -13.46 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -58.46 -14.62 -1.78 
20 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -60.00 -15.00 -2.16 
D
istance 
21 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -15.00 -60.00 -15.00 -2.16 
 Column Sum -220.87 -308.98 -258.71 -289.73 -1078.29   
 Column Mean -10.52 -14.71 -12.32 -13.80  -12.84  
 Column Effect 2.32 -1.88 0.52 -0.96    
 
 
86 
 
 
Table 26.  Error Computation for Experiment 3 
  Orientation 
  90 180 270 360 
1 2.14 -5.34 2.78 0.42 
2 2.27 -4.13 3.15 -1.29 
3 2.46 -3.14 0.53 0.15 
4 2.08 -3.07 1.26 -0.27 
5 0.32 0.61 -1.12 0.19 
6 -1.34 1.55 -0.84 0.63 
7 -0.45 0.73 -0.09 -0.19 
8 0.61 0.22 -0.17 -0.66 
9 0.97 0.00 -0.39 -0.58 
10 0.65 0.22 -0.17 -0.70 
11 0.14 0.39 0.00 -0.53 
12 0.20 0.37 -0.02 -0.55 
13 -0.67 0.66 0.27 -0.26 
14 -0.25 0.52 0.13 -0.40 
15 -0.75 1.02 -0.37 0.10 
16 -0.82 1.36 -0.98 0.44 
17 -0.82 1.38 -1.02 0.46 
18 -0.92 1.41 -0.98 0.49 
19 -1.16 1.49 -0.90 0.57 
20 -2.32 1.88 -0.52 0.96 
D
istance 
21 -2.32 1.88 -0.52 0.96 
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Table 27.  Error Squares for Experiment 3 
  Orientation  
  90 180 270 360  
1 4.59 28.53 7.70 0.18 41.00 
2 5.16 17.09 9.94 1.66 33.85 
3 6.03 9.85 0.28 0.02 16.18 
4 4.34 9.43 1.58 0.07 15.42 
5 0.10 0.37 1.26 0.04 1.77 
6 1.81 2.41 0.71 0.40 5.33 
7 0.20 0.53 0.01 0.04 0.77 
8 0.38 0.05 0.03 0.43 0.89 
9 0.95 0.00 0.16 0.33 1.44 
10 0.42 0.05 0.03 0.48 0.98 
11 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.28 0.45 
12 0.04 0.14 0.00 0.30 0.48 
13 0.45 0.44 0.07 0.07 1.03 
14 0.06 0.27 0.02 0.16 0.51 
15 0.57 1.04 0.14 0.01 1.76 
16 0.67 1.84 0.96 0.19 3.66 
17 0.67 1.89 1.03 0.21 3.81 
18 0.85 1.99 0.96 0.24 4.06 
19 1.36 2.22 0.81 0.33 4.72 
20 5.38 3.52 0.27 0.92 10.09 
D
istance 
21 5.38 3.52 0.27 0.92 10.09 
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Table 28.  Sample Squares for Experiment 3 
  Orientation  
  90 180 270 360 Row Sum
1 0.02 139.71 1.72 26.42 167.87 
2 2.43 147.87 6.15 70.56 227.01 
3 27.14 225.00 79.92 116.42 448.49 
4 31.92 225.00 68.56 127.24 452.72 
5 123.21 225.00 205.64 210.25 764.10 
6 187.69 225.00 225.00 225.00 862.69 
7 143.52 225.00 180.10 225.00 773.62 
8 108.37 225.00 169.00 223.80 726.17 
9 96.63 225.00 169.00 214.92 705.54 
10 107.74 225.00 169.00 225.00 726.74 
11 122.32 225.00 169.00 225.00 741.32 
12 120.34 225.00 169.00 225.00 739.34 
13 147.38 225.00 169.00 225.00 766.38 
14 134.10 225.00 169.00 225.00 753.10 
15 158.26 225.00 196.00 225.00 804.26 
16 168.48 225.00 223.20 225.00 841.68 
17 169.00 225.00 225.00 225.00 844.00 
18 172.66 225.00 225.00 225.00 847.66 
19 181.17 225.00 225.00 225.00 856.17 
20 225.00 225.00 225.00 225.00 900.00 
D
istance 
21 225.00 225.00 225.00 225.00 900.00 
 Column Sum2652.39 4562.583494.28 4139.61  
     SSY = 14848.86 
     SS0 = 13841.78 
     SSA = 211.87 
     SSB = 633.38 
     SSAB = 158.28 
     SST = 1007.08 
     SSE = 3.56 
       
     Explained by Orientation = 21.04% 
     Explained by Distance = 62.89% 
     Explained by Interactions = 15.72% 
     Unexplained = 0.35% 
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Table 29.  ANOVA for Experiment 3 
Component Sum of Squares 
Percentage 
of Variation
Degrees 
of 
Freedom
Mean 
Square
F-
Computed 
F-
Table 
y 14848.86  84    
y.. 13841.78  1    
y-y.. 1007.08 100.00% 83    
Orientation 211.87 21.04% 3 70.62 1190.35 4.31 
Distance 633.38 62.89% 20 31.67 533.78 2.37 
Errors 3.56 0.35% 60 0.06   
       
 Std Dev Errors = 0.24     
 Std Dev Mean = 0.03     
 Std Dev Orientation = 0.05     
 Std Dev Distance = 0.12     
 
Table 30.  90% Confidence Intervals for Effects for Experiment 3 
Parameter Mean Effect Std Dev Conf Interval 
Mean -12.84 0.03 -12.88 -12.79 
Orientation     
90 2.32 0.05 2.24 2.40 
180 -1.88 0.05 -1.95 -1.80 
270 0.52 0.05 0.44 0.59 
360 -0.96 0.05 -1.04 -0.88 
Distance     
1 8.23 0.12 8.04 8.43 
2 6.69 0.12 6.49 6.89 
3 2.85 0.12 2.65 3.05 
4 2.78 0.12 2.59 2.98 
5 -0.90 0.12 -1.10 -0.70 
6 -1.84 0.12 -2.04 -1.64 
7 -1.01 0.12 -1.21 -0.81 
8 -0.51 0.12 -0.70 -0.31 
9 -0.29 0.12 -0.48 -0.09 
10 -0.51 0.12 -0.71 -0.31 
11 -0.68 0.12 -0.88 -0.48 
12 -0.66 0.12 -0.85 -0.46 
13 -0.95 0.12 -1.15 -0.75 
14 -0.81 0.12 -1.01 -0.61 
15 -1.31 0.12 -1.51 -1.11 
16 -1.64 0.12 -1.84 -1.44 
17 -1.66 0.12 -1.86 -1.46 
18 -1.70 0.12 -1.90 -1.50 
19 -1.78 0.12 -1.98 -1.58 
20 -2.16 0.12 -2.36 -1.96 
21 -2.16 0.12 -2.36 -1.96 
* Not Significant    
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Table 31.  Computation of Effects for Experiment 4 
  Orientation    
  90 180 270 360 Row Sum Row Mean Row Effect 
1 0.00 -7.40 0.00 -1.00 -8.40 -2.10 9.16 
2 0.00 -10.02 -0.14 -5.00 -15.16 -3.79 7.47 
3 -5.00 -10.51 -3.00 -10.00 -28.51 -7.13 4.13 
4 -3.00 -11.24 -5.00 -10.00 -29.24 -7.31 3.95 
5 -10.82 -15.00 -10.00 -15.00 -50.82 -12.71 -1.45 
6 -15.00 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00 -58.00 -14.50 -3.24 
7 -10.00 -15.00 -10.00 -13.42 -48.42 -12.11 -0.85 
8 -10.00 -13.00 -6.06 -15.00 -44.06 -11.02 0.24 
9 -10.00 -13.00 -6.18 -13.00 -42.18 -10.55 0.71 
10 -10.00 -13.00 -7.88 -13.00 -43.88 -10.97 0.29 
11 -10.00 -13.34 -6.68 -15.00 -45.02 -11.26 0.00 
12 -10.00 -13.00 -9.82 -15.00 -47.82 -11.96 -0.70 
13 -11.00 -13.00 -10.34 -13.00 -47.34 -11.84 -0.58 
14 -11.00 -13.88 -13.00 -15.00 -52.88 -13.22 -1.96 
15 -13.00 -13.00 -11.00 -15.00 -52.00 -13.00 -1.74 
16 -12.54 -14.54 -11.00 -15.00 -53.08 -13.27 -2.01 
17 -13.00 -15.00 -11.00 -15.00 -54.00 -13.50 -2.24 
18 -13.00 -15.00 -11.80 -15.00 -54.80 -13.70 -2.44 
19 -13.00 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00 -56.00 -14.00 -2.74 
20 -13.00 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00 -56.00 -14.00 -2.74 
D
istance 
21 -15.00 -15.00 -13.00 -15.00 -58.00 -14.50 -3.24 
 Column Sum -208.36 -278.93 -184.90 -273.42 -945.61   
 Column Mean -9.92 -13.28 -8.80 -13.02  -11.26  
 Column Effect 1.34 -2.03 2.45 -1.76    
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Table 32.  Error Computation for Experiment 4 
  Orientation 
  90 180 270 360 
1 0.76 -3.27 -0.35 2.86 
2 2.45 -4.20 1.20 0.55 
3 0.79 -1.36 1.68 -1.11 
4 2.97 -1.90 -0.14 -0.93 
5 0.55 -0.27 0.25 -0.53 
6 -1.84 1.53 -0.95 1.26 
7 0.77 -0.87 -0.35 0.45 
8 -0.32 0.04 2.50 -2.22 
9 -0.79 -0.43 1.91 -0.69 
10 -0.37 0.00 0.64 -0.27 
11 -0.08 -0.06 2.12 -1.98 
12 0.62 0.98 -0.32 -1.28 
13 -0.50 0.86 -0.96 0.60 
14 0.88 1.37 -2.23 -0.02 
15 -1.34 2.03 -0.45 -0.24 
16 -0.61 0.76 -0.18 0.03 
17 -0.84 0.53 0.05 0.26 
18 -0.64 0.73 -0.55 0.46 
19 -0.34 1.03 -1.45 0.76 
20 -0.34 1.03 -1.45 0.76 
D
istance 
21 -1.84 1.53 -0.95 1.26 
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Table 33.  Error Squares for Experiment 4 
  Orientation  
  90 180 270 360  
1 0.58 10.72 0.12 8.20 19.63 
2 6.03 17.68 1.43 0.31 25.45 
3 0.63 1.84 2.81 1.23 6.51 
4 8.85 3.63 0.02 0.86 13.36 
5 0.30 0.07 0.06 0.28 0.72 
6 3.37 2.33 0.91 1.59 8.20 
7 0.59 0.76 0.12 0.20 1.67 
8 0.10 0.00 6.26 4.94 11.31 
9 0.62 0.18 3.66 0.48 4.95 
10 0.13 0.00 0.41 0.07 0.61 
11 0.01 0.00 4.51 3.93 8.44 
12 0.38 0.96 0.10 1.64 3.09 
13 0.25 0.74 0.92 0.36 2.26 
14 0.78 1.86 4.98 0.00 7.63 
15 1.78 4.10 0.20 0.06 6.15 
16 0.37 0.57 0.03 0.00 0.97 
17 0.70 0.28 0.00 0.07 1.04 
18 0.40 0.53 0.31 0.21 1.45 
19 0.11 1.05 2.11 0.58 3.85 
20 0.11 1.05 2.11 0.58 3.85 
D
istance 
21 3.37 2.33 0.91 1.59 8.20 
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Table 34.  Sample Squares for Experiment 4 
  Orientation  
  90 180 270 360 Row Sum
1 0.00 54.76 0.00 1.00 55.76 
2 0.00 100.40 0.02 25.00 125.42 
3 25.00 110.46 9.00 100.00 244.46 
4 9.00 126.34 25.00 100.00 260.34 
5 117.07 225.00 100.00 225.00 667.07 
6 225.00 225.00 169.00 225.00 844.00 
7 100.00 225.00 100.00 180.10 605.10 
8 100.00 169.00 36.72 225.00 530.72 
9 100.00 169.00 38.19 169.00 476.19 
10 100.00 169.00 62.09 169.00 500.09 
11 100.00 177.96 44.62 225.00 547.58 
12 100.00 169.00 96.43 225.00 590.43 
13 121.00 169.00 106.92 169.00 565.92 
14 121.00 192.65 169.00 225.00 707.65 
15 169.00 169.00 121.00 225.00 684.00 
16 157.25 211.41 121.00 225.00 714.66 
17 169.00 225.00 121.00 225.00 740.00 
18 169.00 225.00 139.24 225.00 758.24 
19 169.00 225.00 169.00 225.00 788.00 
20 169.00 225.00 169.00 225.00 788.00 
D
istance 
21 225.00 225.00 169.00 225.00 844.00 
 Column Sum2445.32 3787.981966.24 3838.10  
     SSY = 12037.64 
     SS0 = 10644.98 
     SSA = 315.13 
     SSB = 936.25 
     SSAB = 139.34 
     SST = 1392.66 
     SSE = 1.95 
       
     Explained by Orientation = 22.63% 
     Explained by Distance = 67.23% 
     Explained by Interactions = 10.00% 
     Unexplained = 0.14% 
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Table 35.  ANOVA for Experiment 4 
Component Sum of Squares 
Percentage 
of Variation
Degrees 
of 
Freedom
Mean 
Square
F-
Computed 
F-
Table 
y 12037.64  84    
y.. 10644.98  1    
y-y.. 1392.66 100.00% 83    
Orientation 315.13 22.63% 3 105.04 3236.48 4.31 
Distance 936.25 67.23% 20 46.81 1442.32 2.37 
Errors 1.95 0.14% 60 0.03   
       
 Std Dev Errors = 0.18     
 Std Dev Mean = 0.02     
 Std Dev Orientation = 0.03     
 Std Dev Distance = 0.09     
 
Table 36.  90% Confidence Intervals for Effects for Experiment 4 
Parameter Mean Effect Std Dev Conf Interval 
Mean -11.26 0.02 -11.29 -11.22 
Orientation     
90 1.34 0.03 1.28 1.39 
180 -2.03 0.03 -2.08 -1.97 
270 2.45 0.03 2.40 2.51 
360 -1.76 0.03 -1.82 -1.71 
Distance     
1 9.16 0.09 9.01 9.30 
2 7.47 0.09 7.32 7.61 
3 4.13 0.09 3.98 4.28 
4 3.95 0.09 3.80 4.09 
5 -1.45 0.09 -1.59 -1.30 
6 -3.24 0.09 -3.39 -3.10 
7 -0.85 0.09 -0.99 -0.70 
8 0.24 0.09 0.10 0.39 
9 0.71 0.09 0.57 0.86 
10 0.29 0.09 0.14 0.43 
11 0.00 0.09 -0.14 0.15 
12 -0.70 0.09 -0.84 -0.55 
13 -0.58 0.09 -0.72 -0.43 
14 -1.96 0.09 -2.11 -1.82 
15 -1.74 0.09 -1.89 -1.60 
16 -2.01 0.09 -2.16 -1.87 
17 -2.24 0.09 -2.39 -2.10 
18 -2.44 0.09 -2.59 -2.30 
19 -2.74 0.09 -2.89 -2.60 
20 -2.74 0.09 -2.89 -2.60 
21 -3.24 0.09 -3.39 -3.10 
* Not Significant    
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